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Party Reform, the Winner-Take-All
Primary, and the California Delegate
Challenge: The Gold Rush Revisited
James F. Blumstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Immediately prior to the 1972 Democratic National Convention,
a political-legal drama of significant magnitude unfolded. The arena
shifted from hotel lobbies to hearing rooms, to committee rooms, to the
living room of a United States district judge, to the courtroom, to
various vacation spots where the Supreme Court Justices recently had
retired, to the Supreme Court, and finally to the floor of the Democratic
National Convention itself. At stake was the nomination of the Demo-
cratic Party's presidential candidate to challenge the incumbent Richard
Nixon. Specifically at issue was the validity of the California winner-
take-all primary, which Senator McGovern had won in June, receiving
the entire 271-vote California delegation to the national convention.
The roots of the controversy can be traced to the 1968 Democratic
National Convention, which adopted a minority report from its Rules
Committee abolishing the unit rule down to the precinct level. The
convention also accepted the recommendation of its Credentials Com-
mittee establishing a Commission on Party Structure and Delegate
Selection-the McGovern Commission.' The resolutions adopting the
reports called for the state Democratic parties to give "all Democratic
voters . . . full, meaningful and timely opportunity to participate" in
the delegate selection process and directed the McGovern Commission
to aid the state parties in meeting the convention's charge. 2
After conducting extensive national hearings, the McGovern Com-
mission issued its report, Mandate for Reform, in April 1970, and the
Democratic National Committee adopted it in February 1971. 3 In its
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A. 1966, Yale College,
M.A. 1970. Yale University, LL.B. 1970, Yale Law School.
I. After Senator McGovern announced his candidacy, Representative Donald M. Fraser
chaired the McGovern Commission.
2. See COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION, MANDATE FOR
REFORM 9 & n.], 52-53 (1970) (hereinafter cited as McGOVERN CONIMISSION REPORT).
3. Prior to the 1968 Democratic National Convention, supporters of Senator Eugene
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attempt to put flesh upon the skeleton of the broad charge given by the
1968 convention, the McGovern Commission established guidelines de-
signed to eliminate inequities in the delegate selection process.' The
Commission divided the guidelines into three categories: (I) problems
of access to the delegate selection process; (2) problems of dilution of
influence in the delegate selection process; and (3) mixed problems of
access and dilution.5 Within each category, the Commission established
mandatory rules, which required certain action by the state parties and
advisory rules, which the Commission urged but did not require the state
parties to adopt.' If compliance with a required guideline necessitated
a change of state law, the Commission did not relieve the state parties
from the obligation of accomplishing the required statutory change until
they had made "all feasible efforts," including the holding of hearings,
the introduction of bills, work for the bills' enactment, and amendments
to the state parties' rules "in every necessary way short of exposing the
Party or its members to legal sanctions" in order to accomplish the
change.7
The members of the McGovern Commission disagreed over
whether to adopt a guideline requiring the abolition of winner-take-all
primaries.8 In one guideline, the Commission stated its belief that "a full
and meaningful opportunity to participate in the delegate selection pro-
McCarthy established the Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees
chaired by Governor (now Senator) Harold Hughes of Iowa (the Hughes Commission). The
Hughes Commission completed its report, The Democratic Choice, before the 1968 convention,
and it undoubtedly influenced the convention's commitment to party reform. One striking finding
of the Hughes Commission was that over 600 delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Conven-
tion were selected by procedures in which there had been no direct voter participation since 1966.
COMMISSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC SELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES, THE DEMOCRATIC
CHOICE 24 (1968) (hereinafter cited as HUGHES COMMISSION REPORT). The Hughes Commission
concluded that: "[Sltate systems for selecting delegates to the National Convention and the proce-
dures of the Convention itself, display considerably less fidelity to basic democratic principles than
a nation which claims to govern itself can safely tolerate ....
• ..National parties . . . are media which any segment of the population can use every four
years to express its views, to vindicate its interest, and to change policies. But if existing parties
fail to perform this function, they will not survive." Id. at 2, 15-16. The McGovern Commission
regarded itself as an agent responsible solely to the Democratic National Convention. Conse-
quently, it reasoned that adoption of its report by the Democratic National Committee was
unnecessary. See McGOVERN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 36; Segal, Delegate Selection
Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 873 (1970). See also
Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972),judgment stayed, 92 S. Ct. 2718
(1972).
4. McGoVERN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33.
5. Id. at 38.
6. Id. at 34-36.
7. Id. at 37.
8. See Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
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cess is precluded unless the presidential preference of each Democrat is
fairly represented at all levels of the process."9 The Commission, how-
ever, decided not to require state parties to have minority viewpoints
represented within their delegations to the 1972 national convention; 10
instead, the Commission urged the state parties to adopt fair minority
representation procedures and recommended that the 1972 convention
"adopt a rule requiring state parties to provide for representation of
minority views to the highest level of the nominating process for the
1976 National Convention."" Since the minority representation guide-
line was not mandatory, the "all feasible efforts" standard for changing
conflicting state law did not apply.
After the adoption of the McGovern Commission Report, the Cali-
fornia Democratic Party succeeded in altering state law on delegate
selection, 2 but the party chose not to seek the abolition of the state's
winner-take-all primary.' 3 Thus, with all of the 271 delegates awarded
to California under the allocation formula devised by the Democratic
National Committee at stake," it became increasingly clear as the pri-
mary season wore on that the California winner-take-all primary elec-
tion would play the pivotal role in determining the Democratic Party's
presidential nominee. 5
9. MCGOVIERN COMMISSION REPIORT, supra note 2, at 44. See also Note, Regulation of
Political Parim: Vote Ditluion in the Presidential Nomination Procedure, 54 IOWA L. REtv. 471
(1968): "Vote dilution may ... occur when there is no provision for minority delegate representa-
tion at succeeding levels in the nomination procedure. If a plurality or majority vote in each district
selects (he representation for that district, those votes cast for other presidential candidates receive
no weight beyond the precinct caucus or primary election." Id. at 483.
10. Brown v. O'Brien. Civil No. 72-1628, at 6 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
1I. McGOVFRN COIMISSION Rll'ORT, supra note 2, at 44-45. At their 1972 convention, the
Democrats abolished winner-take-all primaries because they fail to provide for representation of
minority viewpoints within a state's delegation. This action was recommended by the Rules Com-
mittee. COMMITTI-F ON Ru i:s oi TIHE 1972 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, REPORT § 4
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Rui.Es CoMzirrim RIEI'ORT], and approved by the convention. N.Y.
Times. July 13, 1972, at 24. col. 2.
12. See CAl. Ei. ic-rioNs CoiE § 6300 et seq. (West Supp. 1972).
13. C. CAm. EiC-TIONS Coim, § 6386 (West Supp. 1972). See generally Brown v. O'Brien,
Civil No. 72-1628 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
14. For discussions of the allocation formula chosen by the Democrats see Bode v. National
Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972) (delegates
need not be allocated exclusively in accord with a "one Democrat, one vote" formula): Georgia v.
National Democratic Party. 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (delegates
need not be allocated exclusively according to a state's total population). For a discussion of the
Republican allocation formula see Ripon Soe'y v. National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168
(D.D.C. 1972).
15. The phenomenon was not limited to 1972. In 1968, Senator Robert Kennedy's victory
in California briefly made him the frontrunner for the nomination. Moreover, the California
primary also has held special importance to the Republican Party. In 1964, Senator Barry Goldwa-
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The legal issues underlying the California delegate challenge at the
1972 Democratic National Convention are the subject of this Article.
The Article briefly will sketch some of the recent constitutional develop-
ments in party reform litigation. It will argue that winner-take-all pri-
maries, especially in California because of its size, are violations of
equal protection as interpreted by the voting rights cases decided during
the past 40 years. 6 Finally, it will take the superficially paradoxical
position that despite its unconstitutionality, California's winner-take-all
primary did not violate the rules governing delegate selection to the 1972
Democratic National Convention; therefore, unless declared unconstitu-
tional by a court, the 1972 Democratic National Convention should
only have invalidated California's winner-take-all primary prospec-
tively. Of course, that is in fact what happened after all the turmoil had
ended.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO PRO-
MOTE INTRAPARTY DEMOCRACY
Although the framers of the Constitution did not account for politi-
cal parties, 7 their phenomenal growth soon made it apparent that politi-
cal parties were important parts of the elective process. With this reali-
zation, states sought to impose restrictions upon them. At the outset,
courts apparently were reluctant to permit governmental regulation;18
but as the parties themselves failed to clean up the corruption and fraud
that accompanied the election process, and as the extraordinary import-
ance of the parties within the election process became more and more
evident, the courts adopted a more receptive attitude toward state regu-
lation of party activities. 9
ter effectively assured himself of the Republican nomination by defeating New York's Governor
Nelson Rockefeller in the California primary.
16. This argument is intimated in R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 565-71 (1968).
Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating
Conventions, 78 YALE L.J. 1228, 1239-40 n.45 (1969).
17. The twelfth amendment, enacted in 1804, changed the prior method of presidential and
vice presidential selection described in article II, § I of the Constitution. Prior to the amendment.
electors cast ballots for 2 persons without designating their respective choices for president and
vice president. The person receiving a majority of the votes became the president and the person
receiving the second highest total became the vice president. The twelfth amendment requires
electors to cast separate ballots for the president and vice president, and implicitly recognizes the
realities of political party nominations.
18. See Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National Political
Conventions, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 148, 153 (1970).-
19. See Brief for Common Cause as Amicus Curiae, at 6-9, Maxey v. Washington State
Democratic Comm., Civil No. 71-1051 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1971); Note, supra note 18, at 153-54.
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A. Judicial Protection of the Nomination Process
After the power of government to regulate political parties became
established, the question of whether constitutional protections apply to
the party processes of nomination and endorsement arose. In a series
of cases from 1927-1953 (frequently referred to as the White Primary
Cases),'2 the Supreme Court established the rule that all procedures
which form an integral part of the election process and discriminate on
the basis of race are subject to scrutiny under the Constitution. In Gray
v. Sanders, 2  the first substantive equal protection voting rights case
decided by the Supreme Court after its landmark procedural decision
in Baker v. Carr,22 the Court held that the guarantee of equal protection
applies to primary elections, regardless of whether the factor of racial
discrimination is involved. Recently, the Court reaffirmed its commit-
ment to impose the constitutional requirements of equal protection upon
all the integral parts of the election process in Moore v. Ogilvie,24 a case
that held unconstitutional an Illinois statute requiring new political par-
ties to obtain at least 200 signatures from each of 50 counties in order
to appear on the ballot.?
B. Applying Constitutional Safeguards to Intraparty Procedures: The
Barrier of State Action
When courts move from the realm of the election process and
attempt to apply constitutional safeguards to intraparty procedures,
they must face the threshold question of state action. Professor Charles
Black has aptly observed that "[t]he field is a conceptual disaster
area." Although the White Primary Cases seemingly provide an um-
brella of state action sufficient to cover the party nomination process,
20. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United
States v. Classic. 313 U.S. 299 (1941): Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73 (1932): Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th
Cir. 1949): Rice v. Elmore. 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
21. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
22. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. 372 U.S. at 379-80.
24. 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1969). Moore v. Ogilvie overruled MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S.
281 (1948). in which Justice Douglas dissented as follows: "The protection which the Constitution
gives voting rights covers not only the general election but also extends to every integral part of
the electoral process, including primaries. . . . When candidates are chosen for the general elec-
tion by a nominating petition, that procedure also becomes an integral part of the electoral process.
It is entitled to the same protection as that which the Fourteenth Amendment grants any other
part." 335 U.S. at 288 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Since Justice Douglas wrote the opinion in Moore
v. Ogilvie, it seems clear that his earlier dissent is now the law.
25. 394 U.S. at 819. Illinois has 102 counties.
26. Black, The Supreme Court- Foreword, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
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as recently as 1968 at least one court held that a delegate selection
process did not involve state action sufficient to invoke the equal protec-
tion guarantees." Nevertheless, the more recent cases involving chal-
lenges to delegate selection procedures have held that state action was
present. 8 Moreover, in two cases decided in 1971 by the District of
Columbia Circuit, different panels of the court held that the process by
which the Democratic Party allocated delegates to the states for its
national convention involved state action. When the dramatic Califor-
nia delegate challenge arose, the trend toward finding state action31 in
intraparty nomination contests already was well established .3
C. The Functional Approach to Intervention in
Intraparty Procedures
Their traditional reluctance to intervene in the internal operation
27. Smith v. State Democratic Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371, 375-76 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
Another court perhaps held that relief in a delegate selection challenge was unwarranted because
no state action was present. See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 801
(D. Minn.), affdper curiam, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). Most commentators reject the proposi-
tion. See, e.g., Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of Presidential Nominating Conventions, 56 VA.
L. REV. 179, 194-96 (1970); Note, supra note 16, at 1232-35. But see Note, One Man. One Vote
and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 536, 538-44
(1970).
28. See Doty v. Montana State Democratic Cent. Comm., 333 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D. Mont.
197 1): Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673,678 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
29. See Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1971): Georgia
v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Ripon Soc'y v.
National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972).
30. In a related area, a court has held that party delegate selection rules fall within the
provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, requiring submission of any change to the
United States Attorney General or approval by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. MacGuire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
31. Insofar as the constitutional validity of a state-decreed primary is concerned, little con-
troversy exists over whether there is sufficient state action involved to invoke constitutional protec-
tions. Even commentary that rejects the argument that state action exists in intraparty challenges
acknowledges that "[iin those states whose statutes prescribe. . . the selection of national conven-
tion delegates . . . a finding of state action would be justified." Note, supra note 27, at 541. The
California statute that establishes the state's winner-take-all primary is a clearcut commitment by
the state legislature to a particular procedure. Even under the most limited viewpoint of state
action, the primary would be susceptible to challenge under the fourteenth amendment. See Bar-
thelmes v. Morris, 342 F. Supp. 153, 157 (D. Md. 1972).
The state action issue with respect to the action by the Democratic Party's Credentials Com-
mittee is less clear. The court of appeals dealt with the problem summarily, but the Supreme Court
indicated that the presence of state action might be in serious question. See notes 223-39 infra and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court may intend to re-establish the importance of the state
action doctrine as a decision-making tool. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), in
which the Court rejected for lack of state action a challenge to Pennsylvania's practice of issuing
liquor licenses to private clubs that discriminate on the basis of race. For further discussion of the
state action issue see pp. 1015-16 infra.
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of a voluntary association nevertheless has caused courts to analyze
carefully the function that a party is performing when application of
constitutional safeguards to intraparty procedures is being sought. The
first significant articulation of this functional approach to party affairs
was the decision of Lynch v. Torquato,32 in which the Third Circuit
refused to apply one person, one vote principles to the election of a
county chairman whose function the court found to be primarily the
internal management of party affairs. The court indicated that if the
challenge involved a governmental function of the party, like the nomi-
nation of candidates, state action sufficient to trigger judicial interven-
tion would exist.33
The most recent application of the functional approach occurred
in Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Committee.34 In that
case, the Second Circuit adopted the approach used by the Third Circuit
in Lynch v. Torquato. The plaintiff's challenge in Seergy involved a
statute that permitted members of the party county committee to cast
equal votes although they represented districts of unequal population.
The court described the county committee's function as "essentially to
handle the party's internal affairs at the county level. . . [although] [i]n
rare instances, the county committee may choose the party nominee or
play a major part in that determination. ' 3 The court also stated that
"the essential standard . . . is whether their function in voting is to
select a nominee for public governmental office, as distinguished from
conduct of the private affairs of their political organization. 136 The
Second Circuit's holding in Seergy apparently states the current law on
the application of equal protection principles to intraparty disputes: if
the challenge is to matters that affect management of the party, the
courts will not intervene; but if the challenge relates to party action that
is governmental in nature-for example, nominating a candidate for
office-then the guarantees of the equal protection clause apply.
37
32. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
33. Acknowledging that one person, one vote principles applied to both state-regulated and
party-conducted primaries, the court said that "this is because the function of primaries is to select
nominees for government office even though, not because, they are party enterprises." 343 F.2d
at 372.
34. 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972).
35. 459 F.2d at 310.
36. Id. at 313.
37. See id. at 314.
1972]
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D. The Growth of One Person, One Vote as a Standard of Equal
Protection
Hadley v. Junior College District38 represents the broadest appli-
cation to date of the one person, one vote formula by the Supreme
Court.39 In that case, the Court held that equal protection meant one
person, one vote in the context of an election for the board of trustees
of a junior college district. In its opinion, the Court announced a thresh-
old test for the application of one person, one vote principles: if the
persons to be elected perform governmental functions, then the one
person, one vote doctrine applies. Moreover, the Hadley Court rejected
a different kind of functional approach that had been suggested earlier
in Sailors v. Board of Education.0 In Sailors, local school districts chose
representatives to sit on the county school board; since the local districts
had unequal population and the representatives all cast equally weighted
ballots, the procedure was challenged on the basis of the one person, one
vote principle. The Supreme Court articulated two bases for upholding
the procedure. First, it viewed the procedure as an essentially appointive
process. In fact, it found that no election for the county school board
ever took place or was intended.4 Since the Court has never decreed in
what circumstances an election was constitutionally mandated,' 2 and
since the equal population principle, as previously derived, applied only
when there was a commitment to a popular election, the principle did
not apply in Sailors.13 Secondly, the court in Sailors intimated that the
office involved was administrative rather than legislative and apparently
38. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
39. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court held that matters of appor-
tionment of state legislatures were justiciable and subject to adjudication in federal courts under
the equal protection clause. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and its companion cases later
held that the guarantee of equal protection in the context of legislative apportionment requires the
legislative districts in both houses of a bicameral state legislature to have substantially equal
population. In subsequent cases, the Court extended the equal population principle to local units
of government of general legislative power in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), and
to special purpose districts in Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970). At the same
time, the Court developed a very strict rule of population equality, refusing to accept any set
deviation from equality as de minimis. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). In the most recent one person, one vote case, which involved a
local legislative body, the Court seemingly retreated from its previous rigidity and accepted a larger
deviation from perfect population equality because of historic reasons and the lack of a built-in
bias. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
40. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
41. Id. at 109.
42. See Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 233 (1966).
43. See Note, supra note 16, at 1242.
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attached constitutional significance to that difference." The Hadley
Court, however, rejected this legislative-administrative distinction. 5
As a result of the Hadley decision, the application of the one per-
son, one vote doctrine hinges upon two related factors. First, there must
be a commitment to an elective process; and secondly, the persons
elected at the threshold must be performing governmental functions.
Once the "governmental function" threshold requirement is met, how-
ever, no further functional distinctions are of constitutional significance.
This approach to the one person, one vote doctrine easily meshes with
the approach used by the lower federal courts to define the application
of equal protection principles in the intraparty dispute context.
E. Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Committee: The
Application of One Person, One Vote to Intraparty Nomination
Procedures
Three principles emerge from the preceding discussion. The White
Primary Cases, Gray v. Sanders, and Moore v. Ogilvie make it clear
that the nomination process is an integral part of the election process,
to which constitutional safeguards apply. Lynch v. Torquato and Seergy
v. Kings County Republican County Committee distinguish the internal
management and governmental functions of political parties. They
apply constitutional safeguards to intraparty disputes concerning politi-
cal parties' governmental functions-for example, the nomination pro-
cess-but refuse to resolve internal management squabbles on a consti-
tutional basis. Finally, Hadley v. Junior College District indicates that
one person, one vote principles will apply to political party operations
that are governmental in nature, provided that there is a commitment
to an elective process."
Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Committee" represents
the intersection of these three principles. District Judge Goodwin recog-
44. 387 U.S. at 110.
45. The Court in Hadley' specifically and unequivocally rejected this distinction, saying
"there is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the basis
of the purpose of the election. . . . It should be remembered that in cases like this one we are
asked by voters to insure that they are given equal treatment, and from their perspective the harm
from unequal treatment is the same in any election, regardless of the officials selected." 397 U.S.
at 55.
46. The McGovern Commission also recognizes the separate role that a party plays in the
nomination process. In one guideline, the Commission stated that "[w]henever other party business
is mixed, without differentiation, with the delegate selection process, the Commission requires
State Parties to. . . clearly designate the delegate selection procedures as distinct from other Party
business." McGOVERN CONMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
47. 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
1972]
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nized the importance of the functional distinction in party roles when
he decided Maxey and its companion case, Dahl v. Republican State
Committee. 8 In Dahl, plaintiffs challenged a state statutory procedure
for electing party officials as a violation of equal protection. Plaintiffs
in Maxey, on the other hand, challenged the Democratic delegate selec-
tion process as a violation of equal protection. Following Lynch v.
Torquato, Judge Goodwin -found that party officials acting solely as
party officials do not necessarily perform governmental functions. Ac-
cordingly, he declined to invalidate the state statute relating exclusively
to selection of party officials; however, he simultaneously held that the
Democratic Party's delegate selection process specifically and exclu-
sively involved the party's role in the process of nominating a presiden-
tial candidate so that the equal protection guarantees applied.49 Moreo-
ver, District Judge Goodwin found that a commitment to the elective
process had been made in Maxey, and that the process of selecting
delegates to the national nominating convention was part of the nomina-
tion process and therefore governmental in nature. Accordingly, he fol-
lowed Hadley v. Junior College District and applied the one person, one
vote formula.5"
Judge Goodwin indicated that the outcome in Maxey also turned
upon a question left open in Gray v. Sanders:" In Gray, the Supreme
Court invalidated the county unit system that Georgia used to nominate
statewide officials in a primary. Under the Georgia procedure, units
were allocated to the counties, and votes were tabulated on a county-
by-county basis, with the plurality winner in each county receiving the
entire unit vote allotted to that county. A victory in the primary election
depended on the unit vote accumulation rather than the popular vote
count. The Supreme Court declared the unit voting procedure to be
unconstitutional, but a footnote to its opinion stated that its holding did
48. 319 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
49. In effect, Maxey involved the situation described in Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370
(3d Cir. 1965), which the Third Circuit indicated would dictate a different result. See text accompa-
nying note 33 supra.
50. Neither the Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm. court nor the court in Doty,
v. Montana State Democratic Cent. Comm. had to decide the problem of defining the appropriate
constituency for determining one person, one vote. See also Bode v. National Democratic Party,
452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972); Barthelmes v.
Morris, 342 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1972). For an interesting discussion of the problems that
selection of any single standard would entail see Goldstein, One Man, One Vote, and the Political
Conventions, Alternative Methods of Implementation: A Political Analysis, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. I
(1971).
51. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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not reach the issue that would be posed if a convention system rather
than a primary election were used to nominate candidates.52 Since the
delegate selection procedure in Maxey ultimately relied on a state con-
vention, Judge Goodwin reasoned that the case required a decision on
the issue left open in Gray's convention footnote. 3 Accordingly, he held
that the one person, one vote principle applies to intraparty nominating
procedures."
F. From One Person, One Vote to Fair and Effective Representation
Gray v. Sanders was a complex case. Commentators have not ap-
preciated fully the breadth of its scope and impact.5 In invalidating
Georgia's county unit system, the Supreme Court indicated that "[t]he
conception of political equality .. .can mean only one thing-one
person, one vote."56 This enunciation of the equal population rule as a
requirement of equal protection subsequently was adopted for state
legislative districts57 and local governments.58
But Gray v. Sanders was not entirely, or even primarily, an equal
population case. Prior to the Gray decision, Georgia had not allocated
units to its counties according to the one person, one vote principle. The
district court in Gray invalidated the plan on that basis, but it left open
the possibility that an appropriately apportioned unit system could pass
constitutional muster.5 The Supreme Court modified the ruling of the
district court, holding that the entire system itself, even if properly
apportioned, inherently would violate the equal protection clause.6" The
Court set forth the principle underlying its decision in a crucial footnote
to its opinion.
52. Id. at 378 n.10.
53. See text accompanying note 61 infra.
54. 319 F. Supp. at 678.
55. See, e.g., Fischer, One Man, One Vote and the Political Convention, Alternative Meth-
ods of Inplementation: A Legal Analysis, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 32, 37-41 (1971); Goldstein, supra
note 50, at 10. But see Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 27, at 199-203.
56. 372 U.S. at 381.
57. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
58. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
59. Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
60. Under the original Georgia statute, the allocation of unit votes to counties was not on a
strict per capita basis. Under a revised statute, Georgia had allocated units to counties pursuant
to a "bracket system" based on broad i6pulation categories. The district court struck down the
revised statute reasoning that the broad population categories, in effect, contained an inherent bias
against the larger counties. 203 F. Supp. at 170. Cf Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (lack
of built-in bias and historical circumstances justify deviation from one person, one vote principle);




The county unit system . . . would allow the candidate winning the popular vote
in the county to have the entire unit vote of that county. Hence the weighting of
votes would continue, even if unit votes were allocated strictly in proportion to
population. Thus if a candidate won 6,000 of 10,000 votes in a particular county,
he would get the entire unit vote, the 4,000 other votes for a different candidate
being worth nothing and being counted only for the purpose of being discarded."
Since the subsequent reapportionment cases derived their language from
it, Gray frequently is seen only from a one person, one vote perspective.
One unquestionably important feature of the ruling in Gray was that a
classification of voters according to geographic areas has an unconstitu-
tional effect unless the voters in each area have a substantially equal
number of representatives on a per capita basis. But Gray dealt with
matters relating to the quality of representation as well. By rejecting the
proposition that an appropriately allocated unit system can be constitu-
tional, Gray establishes that equal protection in the nomination process
embraces a notion of fair and effective political representation at the
locus of decision-making. Per capita equality is not made the exclusive
test of "fair and effective"; rather, it becomes the starting point.
Gray's focus on the nonarithmetical factors in election cases also
raises the problem that an at-large, winner-take-all election can lead to
the same unfair result that the Gray Court condemned in its crucial
vote-discarding footnote. As one commentator has noted concerning
this problem:
A statewide election at large. . . would place each voter on the same plane ....
All voters would be 'weighted' equally . . . . In terms of 'fair and effective repre-
sentation,' however. . . the at-large systems are winner-take-all systems and offer
the prospect that a bare 51 percent statewide popular vote [or less in a plurality-
take-all system] will be magnified into 100 percent representation. This would
constitute a new form of . . . overrepresentation and of underrepresentation of
identifiable portions of the electorate.'2
Gray consequently has implications for the composition of a dele-
gation from a preliminary stage to every subsequent level in the nomina-
tion process. The footnote in Gray disclaiming application of its holding
to a situation in which a convention system rather than a primary
election is used to nominate candidates should be considered as concern-
ing itself primarily with the quality of representation issue. When it left
open the issue of candidate selection by convention, the Court foresaw
the potential impact of its decision on the entire political process and
therefore declined to extend the implications of its decision to another
context. The Supreme Court has not ruled on a quality of representation
61. 372 U.S. at 381 n.12.
62. R. DIXON, supra note 16, at 17.
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or political spectrum representation issue in the context of a party nomi-
nation since its decision of Gray.3 Part III of this Article will argue
that the groundwork already exists for a holding that the California
winner-take-all slate primary violates equal protection because it uncon-
stitutionally discards votes at a "preliminary election that in fact deter-
mines the true weight a vote will have."6
III. THE CALIFORNIA WINNER-TAKE-ALL PRIMARY"
Different statutes govern the Democratic and Republican party
primaries in California. 5 The Democratic Party's statute for delegate
selection was enacted in December 1971 as a response to the McGovern
Commission Guidelines.66 Common to both the Democratic and Repub-
lican Party statutes, however, is the provision that slates of delegates
committed to a particular candidate (or uncommitted) shall be elected
on a statewide winner-take-all basis. The winning slates then are com-
mitted to vote for their candidate for a specified period of time at the
national nominating conventions. Since California had the largest single
delegation to the 1972 Republican Convention and the second largest
delegation to the 1972 Democratic Convention,67 the importance of se-
curing a victory in its primary election is manifest.
63. Although he indicated that he was ruling on this precise issue in Maxey v. Washington
State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673, 679 (W.D. Wash. 1970), District Judge Goodwin's
decision of the case did not require a ruling on whether quality of representation principles apply
to an intraparty nomination process; rather, Maxey, which applied the one person, one vote
principle to the delegate selection procedure, could rely adequately upon the prior decisions of
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (one person, one vote applies when there is a
commitment to an elective process and the persons elected perform "governmental" functions);
Moore v, Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (constitutional safeguards apply to all integral parts of the
election process): Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1965) (constitutional safeguards apply
to party procqdures when the party performs a "governmental function").
Professor Barton has characterized the notion of quality representation as political spectrum
representation. See Barton, The General Election Ballot: More Nontiness or More Representative
Nonhinee ?. 22 STAN. L. REv. 165, 166-67 (1970). The Court has dealt with political spectrum
issues in several multimember legislative district cases. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971): Connor v. Johnson. 402 U.S. 690 (1971): Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966),
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). See also notes 178-200 infra and accompanying text.
In terms of equal population doctrine, the Gray convention footnote might have significance
as a warning that there must be a commitment to an elective process before equal population
principles apply. If a closed convention system without popular participation at the baseline were
used, then the equal population principle of Gray might not apply.
64. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
65. See CAL. ELECTIONS CODE k§ 6200-02 (West 1961) (applicable to the Republican
party): CAL. ELECTIONS CODE .§ 6385-87 (West Supp. 1972) (applicable to the Democratic party).
66. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
67. In California, the candidate receiving a plurality of the votes in any party's primary
receives all of the state's delegates to the party's convention. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6201 (West
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A. The Appropriate Geographic Constituency
In Gray v. Sanders, the Supreme Court indicated that the vote-
discarding feature of the county unit system-what one commentator
has called the "wash out" problem18-violated equal protection because
within a geographical unit all voters must be granted equally effective
ballots.69 Gray involved a primary election to nominate candidates for
various statewide offices; therefore, the Supreme Court found that the
appropriate geographical unit was the entire state. It also is necessary
to determine the proper geographical constituency for the presidential
nomination process in order to analyze the implications of Gray for a
winner-take-all, statewide-slate primary.
7
The nomination of a presidential candidate is one of the major
functions of the national parties. The national Democratic and Republi-
can parties are loose federations of state parties, and the nomination of
a presidential candidate once every four years is one of the few-and,
except for the campaign itself, perhaps the only-truly national organi-
zational efforts undertaken by the major American political parties.
While the parties have assumed such importance that the function of
nominating the two presidential aspirants is subject to constitutional
scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, 7' the process is still largely
contifolled by the national parties themselves;72 consequently, the parties
1961), § 6386 (West Supp. 1972). Democratic delegates are required to vote for the plurality winner
until he receives less than 15% of the votes on any ballot at the convention or until released by the
candidate. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6316 (West Supp. 1972). Republican delegates are pledged to
support the plurality winner for the duration of the convention. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE ,§ 6507,
6058 (West 1961). In a year when many candidates run, as many as 60 to 70% of California voters
consequently may not be represented at their convention. Their votes are discarded, and they are
denied any participation or representation in the bargaining and coalescing of interests that pre-
cedes the final choosing of a presidential nominee.
68. See Note, Bode v. National Democratic Party: Apportionment of Delegates to National
Political Conventions, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1460, 1467 n.37 (1972).
69. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81. A concurring opinion also recognized the
importance of the principle. See 372 U.S. at 382 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. For an indication of the importance of how the geographical constituency is defined see
Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 27, at 200. Chambers and Rotunda argue that if the state is the
proper geographic unit, then Gray v. Sanders may require a statewide winner-take-all primary.
Id. Their conclusion would maximize the unrepresentativeness of the current system, in which the
winner-take-all primary is the exception, and defeat the action of the 1972 Democratic National
Convention abolishing winner-take-all primaries for the 1976 convention. But see McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (district method of selecting Presidential Electors held constitutional).
71. Bode v. National Democratic Comm., 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Georgia
v. National Democratic Comm., 447 F.2d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
72. Unlike a presidential election, for which the Constitution specifies an election procedure,
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, the nomination of a presidential candidate is left to the major political
parties within the limitations imposed by the fourteenth amendment. No equivalent to the Electoral
College is imposed upon the nominating process. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963).
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have a good deal of discretion, within the framework of the guarantee
of equal protection, to establish a nationwide candidate selection mech-
anism.7 3 For reasons of political expediency and convenience, the par-
ties in practice have chosen to focus their procedures for the selection
of delegates to the national nominating conventions upon the various
states. If, however, the national parties should choose to abandon the
states in favor of some other geographical subunit for purposes of dele-
gate selection, the Constitution would not impede them. For example,
the parties could focus their delegate selection procedures on a regional
basis using the federal judicial circuits or the federal executive regions
as the appropriate geographical units for selecting delegates to their
national conventions.7 A state orientation in delegate selection simply
does not have the same special constitutional status that it possesses in
an actual election. The Electoral College system, a specific compromise
at the Constitutional Convention, constitutionally established each
semi-sovereign state as the focus for selecting electors.7 5 The Constitu-
tion does not impose any such requirement upon the nomination pro-
cess. It is therefore inappropriate to view each state as the final decision-
making forum for the nomination of a presidential candidate.
The procedure used by both major American political parties for
the selection of a presidential nominee is clearly an integrated nation-
wide process.7 "Each state of the delegate-selecting process is part of
an over-all unitary plan. . . ,,77 The ultimate forum at which coalition
formation and candidate selection take place in both parties is the na-
tional nominating convention. State statutes explicitly recognize this
and place on the presidential ballot the names of the candidates desig-
73. See Bode v. National Democratic Comm., 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Georgia v. National Democratic Comm., 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ripon Soc'y v. National
Republican Purty, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972).
74. As an intermediate alternative between the present convention system and a single
national primary, Senator Packwood has suggested a series of regional primaries. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 8. 1972. at 12, col. 5. It would seem that Congress could enact either the regional or the
national primary without the necessity of a constitutional amendment.
75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
76. Three political scientists note that the "argument for recognition of state sovereignty in
a national political convention is specious." P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, THE POLITICS
OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS 177 (1960). The resemblance between a state, whose sover-
eignty in the Electoral College is constitutionally established, and the state organization of a
political party with respect to the party's national organization is entirely superficial. David,
Goldman. and Bain conclude that "[a] national political party has its federal aspects, such as its
dependence on state victories to give it the electoral votes necessary for winning a presidential
election. But in its national convention its chief business, the nomination and election of a Presi-
dent, is an operation more national than federal." Id.




nated by the national nominating conventions." There is no separate
ballot status for the winner of the state primary.
Since the presidential nominating convention is the culmination of
a coordinated national procedure for selecting the presidential nomi-
nees, the winner-take-all, statewide-slate primary is analogous to the
Georgia county unit system, and Gray therefore should control. The
appropriate geographic unit for the officers nominated in Georgia was
the state. In the presidential nominating situation, it is the nation. Geor-
gia assigned each county a number of units to be voted as a block for
the candidate winning a plurality of votes within the county. California
has been assigned a number of delegates who are effectively required to
vote as a block for the candidate winning a plurality of votes within the
state-and in fact are chosen for the slate by the candidate on the basis
of commitment to him.79 Its winner-take-all, statewide-slate primary
therefore has the same constitutional defects as the county unit system
invalidated in Gray. Those who vote for a candidate who does not win
a plurality of the popular vote in the primary are effectively excluded
from having a voice at the national nominating convention." Their votes
are discarded prior to the national convention at a preliminary stage in
the nominating process. Under the quality of representation rule enunci-
ated.in Gray, discarding votes in this fashion has an invidious effect
because the right to vote effectively cannot be diluted in "any prelimi-
nary election that in fact determines the true weight a vote will have."',
Intermediate winner-take-all nominating procedures therefore violate
the equal protection clause unless there is some overriding state interest
in the invidious discarding of votes.
78. See, e.g., CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 10204 (West 1961). See also O'Brien v. Brown, 92
S.Ct. 2718 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. The major difference between the Georgia and California systems is that Georgia em-
ployed arithmetic "units" whereas California employs human "units" in the form of delegates. The
choice of California's delegates is so limited, however, that the state might just as well adopt
arithmetic units. The possibility of eventual release to vote for someone other than the plurality
winner does not alter the delegates' status. California has such a large percentage of the total
delegate vote at the convention (9% for the Democrats, and 7% for the Republicans in 1972) that
a victory in its primary is tantamount to ensuring that the plurality winner of the California
primary will never receive less than 15% of the votes cast in any convention ballot. See note 67
supra. Release by their candidate or-in the case of a Republican candidate-breach of pledge,
likely would occur only after several ballots. Consequently, release or breach would occur only
after completion of the crucial initial stages of the coalition-forming process. Moreover, delegates
are unlikely to exert any influence on behalf of anyone who did not vote for the plurality winner.
Even if the delegates are eventually released, only those who voted for candidates ideologically
close to the plurality winner can expect any representation.
80. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 41 (1968) (state may not infringe right of political
association) (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. 372 U.S. at 380. See also DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 137 (1956).
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B. Effective Representation at the Locus of Decision-Making
Numerous cases demonstrate the principle that every voter has a funda-
mental interest in fair and effective representation at the ultimate
decision-making forum. Whenever states have attempted to infringe this
interest, the Supreme Court has required them to justify their actions
by compelling state interests.
1. The White Primary Cases.-In the White Primary Cases,82 the
Supreme Court early and forcefully articulated the principle that each
voter has an interest in effective political participation at the decisive
stage of the elective process. Using a series of racially discriminatory
devices, Texas had attempted to circumvent the fifteenth amendment by
barring blacks from participation in the party nomination process. In
Terry v. Adams,83 a private political group of white Democrats known
as the Jaybird Democratic Association held a straw poll prior to the
primary. Although blacks participated fully in the primary itself and in
the general election, the Jaybirds did not allow blacks to participate in
this "preprimary." Candidates winning the Jaybird primaries typically
ran unopposed in the Democratic primaries. The Supreme Court found
that the exclusion of blacks from the Jaybird primaries was unconstitu-
tional because blacks had been excluded from a significant stage of the
electoral process.
[A]t the sole stage of the local political process where the bargaining and interplay
of rival political forces would make [the blacks' vote] count . . . . [T]he Jaybird
Democratic Association is the decisive power in the county's recognized electoral
process. Over the years its balloting has emerged as the locus of effective political
choice."'
Just as the exclusion of blacks from the election stage where effec-
tive coalition formation and compromise takes place denied them their
fifteenth amendment rights,8 5 the California delegate selection mecha-
nism operates to exclude all representatives other than those winning a
plurality of the primary vote from the nominating convention. The
exclusion discriminates against the supporters of the nonplurality win-
ners who, in multi-candidate contests, often represent the majority of
those participating in the primary. Moreover, the discrimination occurs
at the national nominating convention, the only place where coalitions
can be formed among supporters of presidential candidates from differ-
82. See note 20 supra.
83. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
84. 345 U.S. at 484 (plurality opinion of Clark, Jackson, Reed, JJ., & Vinson, C.J.).





2. The Racial Gerrymander Case.-In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,"
the Supreme Court invalidated an attempt by the city of Tuskegee,
Alabama, to draw its boundaries so as to exclude virtually all of the
city's black voters. The Court held that the attempt to define the city
boundary so as to exclude blacks violated the fifteenth amendment. The
fifteenth amendment prohibits abridgment of the right to vote on ac-
count of race,87 but after the racial gerrymander the blacks were not
totally disfranchised. For example, they still could vote in statewide
elections. Moreover, the subsequent decision of Palmer v. Thompson8
makes it clear that racially motivated governmental actions are not
automatic constitutional violations. In Palmer, the Supreme Court re-
fused to declare that the city of Jackson, Mississippi, had acted uncon-
stitutionally by closing a municipal swimming pool in response to a
federal court order to desegregate the pool. The Court reasoned that
absent a showing that the closing impaired some constitutionally pro-
tected interest, racial motivation alone was an insufficient ground for
overturning the city's action.89 Although the Palmer decision concerned
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause rather than the
fifteenth amendment, the principle enunciated in Palmer seemingly
would apply to the Gomillion situation as well. Something more than
racially motivated line-drawing must have been at stake in Gomillion.
Since the blacks of Tuskegee were not disfranchised, the fifteenth
amendment violation must have rested on some notion that the blacks
of Tuskegee had a constitutionally protected interest in participating in
an electoral forum that significantly affected their lives. Cutting them
off from participation in Tuskegee politics on account of their race
therefore constituted an abridgment of their right to vote in violation
of the fifteenth amendment."
Gomillion bears on California's winner-take-all primary because it
indicates the importance of effective participation in a relevant forum.
Just as the blacks fenced out of Tuskegee could not cast an effective
ballot within the forum making important decisions affecting their wel-
fare, the voters in a statewide, winner-take-all slate primary can partici-
pate in the nomination process but do not cast effective ballots. The
86. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
87. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I.
88. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
89. Id. at 226.
90. See generally Barton, supra note 58, at 179-80.
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ballots of all those voters who do not align themselves with the plurality
winner are washed out. Consequently, all viewpoints except those of the
supporters of the plurality winner systematically are excluded from rep-
resentation at the national convention where the selection of a nominee
occurs.
3. The Reapportionment Cases.-Since its decision of Gray v.
Sanders,9" the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of effec-
tive voter participation at significant stages in the electoral process
numerous times. In Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly,92 decided as
a companion case to Reynolds v. Sims,93 the Supreme Court held that
adoption of an apportionment plan by referendum did not insulate the
plan from scrutiny under the one person, one vote principle. The Court
expressly found that the availability of the referendum device as a means
of correcting malapportionment was an insufficient justification for any
deviation from the one person, one vote principle and declared that,
"[a]n individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's
electorate . . .94
The thrust of the Lucas decision is that an equal opportunity to vote
at one election does not insulate the result of that election from exami-
nation under the equal protection clause. If, as stated by Chief Justice
Warren, a "citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply
because a majority of the people choose that it be,' 9 5 then it surely must
follow that California's winner-take-all primary is also unconstitutional,
unless an overriding state interest justifies the lack of representation for
a large segment of the primary participants at the national convention. 6
In A very v. Midland County, 7 the Supreme Court extended the
one person, one vote rule to local units of government having general
legislative power. The dissenters in A very argued that a properly consti-
tuted state legislature should have substantial leeway in structuring local
units of government, and that because each person had an equal shot
at influencing the state legislature, he should be willing to abide by the
decisions it made about structuring local units of government. The ma-
jority expressly rejected the dissenters' position and said that a majority
of voters may not use a referendum, constitutional provision, or accur-
91. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
92. 377 U.S. 713, 735 (1964).
93. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
94. 377 U.S. at 736.
95. Id. at 736-37.
96. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
97. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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ately apportioned representatives to violate the one person, one vote
principle.9 s A very clearly establishes the principle that satisfaction of the
equal population principle at one level of decision-making does not
mean that deviation from the principle is permissible at another level.
Together, Lucas and A very emphasize the principle of the White Pri-
mary Cases that the equal protection inquiry must extend to all relevant
stages of the electoral process, and voters must have an effective voice
at the locus of decision-making. In the context of the California winner-
take-all primary, these cases require that the supporters of nonplurality
winners have an effective voice at the national nominating convention
even though they had an opportunity to participate in their local pri-
mary.
4. The Voter Qualification Cases.-Kramer v. Union Free
School District99 and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski00 reinforce the thrust of
the reapportionment cases. In Kramer, the Supreme Court held that a
statute setting voting qualifications for participation in local school
board elections was unnecessary to promote a compelling state interest
and therefore unconstitutional. The dissenters in Kramer criticized the
majority opinion because the alleged disfranchisement was not from the
state legislative elections, in which plaintiff could participate equally,
but only from a special purpose district election. 10 1 The Court again
reaffirmed its position that proper representation at the state level could
not validate unrepresentative institutions at the local level and reiterated
its belief that a properly apportioned decision-making body cannot dele-
gate part of its power to another body elected by only a portion of the
eligible voters.1 2 Phoenix v. Kolodziejski demonstrates the same belief.
When a majority of the Supreme Court declared that limiting the fran-
chise to only certain property holders in general obligation bond elec-
tions was unconstitutional, the dissenters argued that since the city
98. "Inequitable apportionment of local governing bodies offends the Constitution even if
adopted by a properly apportioned legislature representing the majority of the State's citizens. The
majority of a State-by Constitutional provision, by referendum, or through accurately appor-
tioned representatives-can no more place a minority in oversize districts without depriving that
minority of equal protection of the laws than they can deprive the minority of the ballot altogether
S. .. Government-National, State, and local-must grant to each citizen the equal protection
of its laws, which includes an equal opportunity to influence the election of lawmakers, no matter
how large the majority wishing to deprive other citizens of equal treatment or how small the
minority who object to their mistreatment." Id. at 481-82 n.6.
99. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
100. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
101. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969) (Stewart, Black &
Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
102. 395 U.S. at 628.
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council was properly apportioned, there was no constitutional viola-
tion." 3 A majority of the Court disagreed and held that non-property
holders were denied equal protection by not being allowed to participate
in the bond election.
From the voter qualification cases as well as the white primary,
racial gerrymander, and reapportionment cases, it is apparent that the
interest in fair and effective representation at the ultimate decision-
making forum, which the Supreme Court identified in Gray v. Sanders,
is of fundamental importance, and that any attempt to infringe it must
undergo strict constitutional scrutiny."4 The Court consistently has re-
fused to accept the theory that satisfaction of equal protection at any
single step in a continuing elective process will guarantee equal protec-
tion throughout that process and protect the fundamental interest in fair
and effective representation at the ultimate decision-making forum. 05 If
a state could choose the forum in which to provide full and effective
representation, the advances in voting equality could be sabotaged eas-
ily.' "' Accordingly, a state must give full protection to the interest of the
voters in effective representation at the national nominating convention,
unless it can show that it has a conflicting interest of overriding import-
ance which it cannot achieve in less restrictive ways.
C. Parallel Constitutional Development: The Ballot Access Cases
The area of general election ballot access offers a policy basis for
applying to intraparty conflict the principle that every voter must have
fair and effective representation at the ultimate decision-making forum.
In Williams v. Rhodes,"7 the Supreme Court invalidated as a violation
of equal protection a series of Ohio statutes that placed excessively
burdensome impediments on third party presidential candidates' access
to the presidential election ballot.0 8 Rhodes represents an attempt by
the Court to establish groundrules for the representation of different
viewpoints within the election system. By reducing barriers to general
103. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 215 (1970) (Stewart, Harlan, JJ., &
Burger, C.J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1970).
105. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 n.10 (1969).
106. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
107. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
108. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas reasoned that the statute infringed upon the
first amendment right of political association as protected by the fourteenth amendment. Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Harlan agreed. 393 U.S. at
41 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Black's majority opinion also relied upon the first amendment,
but as a fundamental interest triggering strict equal protection scrutiny. 393 U.S. at 31.
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election ballot access, Rhodes implicitly encourages the formation of
third parties."9 In contrast, Gray v. Sanders"' and Terry v. Adams",
reflect a doctrine designed to promote intraparty democracy. For exam-
ple, in Terry v. Adams the Court refused to countenance election proce-
dures that barred a racial group from effective participation at an early,
critical stage in the nomination process of their party, and in Gray v.
Sanders the Court struck down the county unit system because it dis-
carded votes at a preliminary stage in the nomination process without
counting them at the ultimate forum of decision-making. Rhodes, Gray,
and Terry all indicate the existence of a constitutionally protected indi-
vidual interest in effective participation in the political process; however,
they suggest different means to promote that interest." 2
Rhodes recognized the importance of political diversity but perhaps
established the formation of third parties as the preferred strategy for
political dissidents to exercise political influence;" 3 yet, it is illogical for
the courts to protect the interest of dissidents in effective political partic-
ipation when they assert it outside the traditional framework of Ameri-
can politics, and to disregard it when they assert it at the centers of
power within the major parties."4 Since the interest at stake is effective
political participation, the guarantee of a place on the ballot to third or
even fourth parties may be less important than a guarantee of demo-
cratic procedures within the major party nominating process."' In the
foreseeable future, groups wishing to influence the choice of candidates
who have a chance to win the presidency must rely on intraparty proce-
109. A variety of factors prevented access to the ballot in Rhodes. Two significant factors
were statutory provisions requiring third party candidates to obtain the signatures of at least 15%
of the electorate 9 months prior to the election. 393 U.S. at 24, 26. In a subsequent case, the Court
has indicated that a straight 5% requirement without any other barriers will pass constitutional
muster. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). also
facilitates access by splinter parties to the general election ballot. See note 24 supra and accompa-
nying text. The rationale underlying both Rhodes and Moore is a belief that the opportunity for
"the advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and
thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes." 393 U.S. at 31.
110. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
111. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
112. See Barton, supra note 63, at 166-67.
113. See Note, supra note 16, at 1251-52.
114. See Barton, supra note 63, at 166; Note, supra note 16, at 1251.
115. Chief Justice Burger recently noted in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), that
constitutional doctrine normally does not favor the abandonment of major party affiliation in order
to pursue basic political rights. Id. at 145. One authority also notes that "the legal monopoly of
parties is generally less important than the actual monopoly; no purpose is served by leaving
complete liberty to nonparty candidates if normally only party candidates have any chance of
success." M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 355 (1955). See also Barton, supra note 63, at 171-
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dures as the major vehicle to accomplish their goal.
Exclusive reliance upon the Rhodes doctrine also could undermine
the traditional stability of the two-party system by fostering splinter
parties."' Minority parties increase the likelihood that a president will
be elected by only a plurality of the popular vote. Encouraging minority
parties therefore might undercut the representativeness of the only office
in the nation for which all Americans vote' 7 and discourage coalition
formation until after the election itself."' Unrepresentative procedures
at the nominating stage could compound the problem. If the major
parties structure their nominating procedures so as to allow a minority
to control intermediate stages of the nominating process (or at best
allow majorities to cancel out entirely any minority strength at interme-
diate stages), the danger of having the President reflect the will of a very
narrow, strategically located, political faction is more acute.,"
Intraparty conflict traditionally has served to promote compromise
and coalition prior to the general election; 2" but when prospects for
success inside a party seem bleak because of unfair delegate selection
procedures, vigorous party activity may be discouraged. 2' Legal doc-
trines that encourage dissidents to desert the major parties rather than
attempt to make themselves heard within the party councils might jeop-
ardize the continued vitality of the two-party system and its attendant
political stability.12 Courts can avoid such destabilization by according
equal weight to the individual interest in effective political participation
when exercised both within and without the major political parties. 2 1
D. A Traditional Equal Protection Approach to the Winner-Take-All
Primary
State legislatures frequently classify citizens into groups for various
purposes. The resulting classifications are subject to scrutiny under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Upon a showing
116. See id. at 167-72.
117. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 53-54, 54 n.8 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
118. See generally A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 54-55 (1971); A. BICKEL, THE
NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM 31-33 (1968).
119. A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 54 (1971).
120. The court in Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn.
1968), characterized the role of major parties as "the direction and control of the struggle for
political power among men who may have contradictory interests and often mutually exclusive
hopes of securing them. This the parties do by institutionalizing the struggle and emphasizing
positive measures to create a strong and general agreement on policies." Id. at 805.
121. See McGOVERN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 13, 49.
122. See id. at 49; HUGHES COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 15-16.
123. See Note, supra note 16, at 1252.
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that the classification has worked to his disadvantage, a petitioner can
impose an obligation upon the state to justify its classificatory scheme.'
24
In determining the content of the state's burden of justification, the
Supreme Court has applied a two-level test.125 In the area of economic
regulation, the Court has only sought to assure that distinctions drawn
by a challenged statute bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
legislative purpose.2 6 On the other hand, in cases involving "suspect
classifications" or touching on "fundamental interests," the Court has
subjected classifications to a strict scrutiny that requires the state to
show not only that it has a compelling interest that justifies the law
creating the classifications, but also that the distinctions drawn by the
law are necessary to further its purpose.21
1. Political Association Impinged.-The winner-take-all primary
designates the faction within each of the major political parties that will
be present at the national nominating conventions and by that presence
able to exercise the constitutionally protected right of political associa-
tion. 128 The winner-take-all slate primary, however, permits only dele-
gates chosen by the plurality winner to join their political power with
that of "fellow partisans" from other states. 29 Supporters of candidates
who do not win a plurality of the primary vote in their states cannot
exercise any political power at the national level of the nominating
process.
The winner-take-all primary thus discriminates between two classes
of persons within each party in a state-those who voted for the plural-
ity winner and all other voters in the primary. A second factor exacer-
bates the problem. The backers of candidates who did not win a plural-
ity of the primary vote in the state not only are unable to join with others
of like persuasion at the national level, but also have their votes joined
with those of their opponents to count against their own candidate at
the national level. Since allocation formulas assign delegates to national
conventions according to the total population and party vote within a
state, a state receives delegate strength for all party factions-but that
124. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065,
1076-1132 (1969).
125. Id.
126. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
127. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
128. "The right to have one's voice heard and one's views considered by the appropriate
governmental authority is at the core of the right of political association." Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 41 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
129. See Petitioner's Brief for Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 55, Delaware v. New
York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966) (use of "fellow partisans" phrase).
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strength works to the disadvantage of all factions other than the one
supporting the plurality winner. Delegates allocated to reflect the
strength of nonplurality winners actually are awarded to an opponent.
The winner-take-all primary is therefore doubly discriminatory-its
rigid structure bars all factions, except supporters of the primary win-
ner, from the national conventions and awards delegates allocated to
represent all the factions to a single faction. By discriminating in favor
of plurality winners, the winner-take-all primary burdens "the right of
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs"'131
which a majority of the Supreme Court in Williams v. Rhodes found
to be a constitutionally protected fundamental interest. 3
2. Political Association Penalized.-In the winner-take-all dele-
gate selection procedure, the sole basis of classification determining
which voters are to receive any representation at the ultimate stage in
the nomination process is candidate preference. Unless supporters of a
particular candidate win a plurality of the popular vote, their voting
strength is ignored entirely for purposes of representation at the national
nominating conventions. It is axiomatic that a voter has the unfettered
right to choose to support any candidate he or she wishes-freedom of
political association can mean nothing less. The winner-take-all system,
however, penalizes all those who have exercised their basic right of
association in a way different from the plurality by creating classifica-
tions that reward those who voted for the plurality winner and exclude
entirely all others from effective political association at the national
level. The only sure way to have an effective voice at the national
convention is to support the candidate who is likely to win the primary;
supporters of any other candidate automatically are excluded from the
critical forums of the national nomination process, the nominating con-
ventions. 1
32
Dunn v. Blumstein3 1 held that durational residency requirements
for voting were unconstitutional. In its opinion the Supreme Court
stated that durational residence laws classified bona fide residents on the
basis of recent travel and penalized only those persons who recently had
exercised that fundamental personal right.' 34 The vice of a durational
130. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
131. Justice Harlan has stated that "no matter what the institution to which the decision is
entrusted, political groups have a right to be heard before it." Id. at 42 (Harlan, J., concurring).
132. If a compromise prior to the primary election is attempted, one likely could not attain
effective representation because he has no ability to ascertain the identity of the plurality winner
with any degree of certainty prior to the primary itself.
133. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
134. Id. at 334.
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residence law is that a person must "choose between travel and the basic
right to vote." ' Winner-take-all primaries offer a similarly distasteful
choice. A voter must choose the candidate who will be picked by the
plurality, if his identity can be divined, or face total impotence at the
national convention and concomitant abridgment of his right of political
association. A state should be able to force this choice upon its voters
only if it can demonstrate that a compelling state interest necessitates
its winner-take-all primary.
IV. THE POLICY ISSUES
Use of the principle of Gray v. Sanders-that every voter has a
fundamental interest in fair and effective representation at the ultimate
decision-making forum-to invalidate the winner.-take-all primary
would assure substantially proportional representation at the national
nominating convention to all political elements in a party. Indeed, a
system of proportional representation 3' may be the only way to make
each vote awarded under the one person, one vote formula an effective
vote. ' Critics maintain, however, that proportional representation
transforms a two-party system into a multiparty system;3 8 promotes
the instability of coalition government; and, unlike a functioning two-
party system, delays the process of compromise until after the final
election.1 39 The extension of proportional representation to the election
stage itself admittedly would exacerbate the destabilizing impact of
Williams v. Rhodes, discussed earlier.' Not only would it be easier for
splinter parties to gain access to the general election ballot, but intra-
party dissidents also would be assured of representation in elective bod-
ies. Part IV of this Article will attempt to show that the critics' fears
are not applicable to party nominations,' and especially not to an
135. Id. at 342.
136. The system of proportional representation is "designed to give each minority a number
of representatives that is proportionate to that minority's electoral strength." Silva, Relation of
Representation and the Party System to the Number of Seats Apportioned to a Legislative
District, 17 W. POL. Q. 742, 757 (1964).
137. See R. DIXON, supra note 16, at 525.
138. Id.
139. See Barton, supra note 63, at 168-69.
140. See notes 107-23 supra and accompanying text.
141. But see A. BICKEL, supra note 119, at 57-58. Professor Bickel accepts the general
principle that minority representation at the national nominating convention should be required,
but admits a few exceptions to that rule. He justifies his exceptions on the ground that the popular
interest generated by a winner-take-all primary helps to educate the electorate. Professor Bickel
also argues that achieving minority representation by a method of proportionality would "tend to
direct attention to presidential preferences, and to de-emphasize other views and attitudes having
to do with issues more than personalities. ... Id. at 59. The objective of voter education,
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intermediate step in the nominating process; rather, proportional repre-
sentation at national conventions is a way to achieve fair and effective
political participation without sacrificing the legitimate goal of main-
taining the stability of the two-party system. 2 Proportional representa-
tion is appropriate for presidential nominating conventions because they
are ultimate decision-making forums in an elective nominating pro-
cess,y 3 not because proportional representation is applicable to all de-
liberative bodies. 4
A. The Interest in Stable and Effective Government
Every state has an interest in ensuring stable and effective govern-
ment.Y5 The Constitution permits a state to advance this interest by
limiting direct participation in representative government. For example,
the Constitution clearly does not require all decisions by a state legisla-
ture to be submitted to a direct vote by the people; nor does the Consti-
tution require every political view to be given representation in the state
however, can be achieved by a multitude of other mechanisms that would burden the minority
representation goal less than a winner-take-all primary. As for the argument that proportionality
overemphasizes personalities, although it is true that the key determinant of representation would
be votes for a candidate, proportional representation does not have to direct voter attention to
candidates' personalities. If further issue refinement is desired, uncommitted slates could be fielded,
or several slates all committed to the same candidate could compete. The latter phenomenon
occurred in the June, 1972, New York primary when the regular Democratic organization slates
in Brooklyn endorsed Senator McGovern, but were defeated by other slates also committed to
McGovern but selected by reform elements in the party.
142. Cf Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (state statute permitting Democratic Party to
close the official primary to any candidate refusing to pledge himself to support candidate named
by the national party is not unconstitutional because twelfth amendment does not demand absolute
freedom for the elector to vote his own choice). The first amendment right of political association
might militate against strict judicial regulation of political parties. See generally Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1959); Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1963). This
consideration, however, is forceful only in the case of small or ad hoc parties and independent
candidates. See Note, supra note 16, at 1250 n.88. The Supreme Court has recognized the signifi-
cance of the difference between the major parties and other political groups. "The fact is that there
are obvious differences in kind between the needs and potentials of a political party with historically
established broad support, on the one hand, and a new or small political organization on the other
.... Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though
they were exactly alike .... " Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 441-42 (1971).
143. See generally P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, supra note 76, at 197-99.
144. "If the Gray rationale were extended mechanically to deliberative nominating bodies
-i.e., functional equivalents of the primary-it might seem that the same rationale could be
applied to invalidate single-member constituencies in state legislatures, for the votes of those who
favor a losing candidate in a district are 'wasted'-not represented-at the decision-making stage
in the legislative process. Such a result, carried to its logical conclusion, would seem to require
strict proportional representation in every legislative body." Note, supra note 16, at 1239 n.45.
145. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
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legislatures. In a representative democracy, the state's need to guarantee
stable and effective government may necessitate limiting an individual's
right to full and effective participation in governmental decisions at
some stage. The state may limit the individual's right, however, only
when such limitations are necessary to achieve its interest in stable and
effective government.14
1. Winner-take-all primaries increase political fragmentation.-
The presidential nominating process does not end after the primary
election. The ultimate selection of a presidential candidate occurs at
the national nominating conventions. The main purpose of these con-
ventions is to make a single choice and a single compromise-the
selection of a presidential candidate." 7 At their nominating conven-
tions, the parties attempt to forge coalitions.18 The ultimate winner of
the presidency is the party (or person) creating the more effective
coalition; however, if the coalition-formation stage is itself unrepresen-
tative-as it necessarily is under California's winner-take-all pri-
mary-serious inequities in the electoral system result.
In the United States, winner-take-all elections generally have div-
ided the relevant electorate into two broad coalitions of interests. In an
election rather than a nominating procedure, the result is a more or less
stable two-party system. The pre-election coalition formation that oc-
curs in a functioning two-party system promotes stability since the give
and take of compromise occurs prior to the election. This preliminary
political activity ensures that a broadly based governing coalition will
control the institutions of government.4 9 In contrast to the election
stage, use of a winner-take-all procedure in the nomination stage im-
pairs the ability of parties to unite behind a single candidate by exagger-
ating factional hostilities and magnifying their importance. 5 ' The intro-
146. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
147. P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, supra note 76, at 177. See also A. BICKEL, supra
note 119, at 59-60.
148. Professor Bickel has noted that it is particularly important to have minorities repre-
sented at the national nominating convention because it "sits briefly and only periodically, and
has as its sole object the composition of a governing coalition. The minority must be there, quite
simply, in order that some portion of it may be coalesced with; or to put in in other terms, no
relevant majority exists for purposes of constituting such a deliberative assembly until the assem-
bly's own majority-building work is done, and that work can be done only if the total or near-
total constituency is present through its delegates." A. BICKEL, THE NEw AGE OF POLITICAL
REFORM 26-27 (1968).
149. See Barton, supra note 63, at 168-69.
150. Winner-take-all primaries tend to exacerbate factional differences and raise the level
of hostility within a party. The winner-take-all primary consequently may promote bimodality
within each party, making ultimate compromise and unity more difficult. See Lowi, Party, Policy
and Constitution in America, in THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS 239-41 (W. Chambers & W.
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duction of winner-take-all elections at an early stage crystallizes fac-
tional differences within the parties. As these differences become more
sharply defined, compromise increasingly becomes more difficult, and
in order to win votes, the factions begin focusing their attacks on the
opposing faction rather than the opposite party.'
On the other hand, a nomination system that translates votes at the
lowest level into representation at all higher levels-including the na-
tional convention-provides each candidate with many opponents
rather than only one. Political strategy, therefore, would bar campaign-
ing against a single opposing faction within the party, 152 and the result
would be a less personalized campaign with a lower level of hostility.
Despite the increased intraparty competition, compromise at the nomi-
nating convention would become less difficult. The convention would be
more pluralistic rather than dualistic and polarized, and, since the con-
vention would represent the political strengths of the various candidates
in the electorate, a losing candidate would be more likely to abide by
the choice of the convention. 153 Far from promoting political instability
and factionalism, representation of all political views at the nominating
conventions would reduce instability by promoting compromise within
the parties.'5'
Burnham eds. 1967); Note, One Man, One Vote and Selection of Delegates to National Nominat-
ing Conventions, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 536, 555-56 (1970). See generally W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL
ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF
DEMOCRACY (1963). A nomination process characterized solely by winner-take-all primaries could
institutionalize what in reality would be a 4-party system. For a discussion of the problems with
the winner-take-all direct primary see Goldstein, supra note 55, at 12-24.
151. A winner-take-all system within the nomination process also impairs the ability of each
party to represent the ideological center of the electorate because there is no pressure on party
factions to form subcoalitions within the party.
152. Nationally syndicated columnist Warren Rogers' study of the Wisconsin primary indi-
cated that the multitude of Democratic candidates focused their critical attention on President
Nixon and not on each other. Mr. Rogers gathered his data by analyzing the content of speeches
and statements made by the candidates and news stories in the local media. See Rogers, Mitchell's
Wondering About Primary Plan, The Nashville Tennessean, April 17, 1972, at 9, col. 1 (Mr.
Rogers confirmed the information by telephone conversation). The Wisconsin primary contrasts
sharply with the intensely personal California campaign in which supporters of Senators Humphrey
and McGovern hurled epithets at each other; given California's winner-take-all primary, however,
the result was predictable.
153. Professor Bickel, in making this point, noted that although minority delegates may not
form part of the ultimate coalition, "minorities are more likely to share a sense of the legitimacy
of the convention, are less likely, although dissatisfied, to be disaffected, if they were present and
had access." A. BICKEL, supra note 119, at 56.
154. The realization that representation of a broad spectrum of intraparty political views at
the nominating convention will promote political stability and compromise rather than instability
or fragmentation has spurred the parties to examine their own procedures for delegate selection
and caused the states to reassess their delegate selection methods. Recognizing the importance of
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2. Limitations on the interest in full and effective
participation.-As intimated above, 15 5 the principle of Gray v.
Sanders-that every voter has a fundamental interest in full and effec-
tive representation at the ultimate decision-making forum-does not
necessarily apply with full force to all election procedures. Moreover,
the voting rights cases have not established when, if ever, the Constitu-
tion requires an election. 5
In Fortson v. Morris,"7 the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia con-
stitutional provision that provided for the selection of the governor by
the General Assembly from the two top vote-getters in a gubernatorial
election in which no candidate received a majority of the popular vote.
The majority viewed the General Assembly election as an "alternative"
to a popular election, to which the standards of Gray v. Sanders did not
apply. 5' The four dissenters disagreed with the Court's factual charac-
terization of the General Assembly selection as an alternative. They
viewed the entire election as one continuing, integrated process., Under
the dissenters' characterization of the selection process, the Georgia
system might have conflicted with Gray's broad principle that votes
cannot be discarded at intermediate stages in the election process.'
Although the majority in Fortson v. Morris could have distinguished
minority representation procedures in the nomination process, most states eschew the winner-take-
all mode of delegate selection. See U.S. SENATE, NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 74-177 (1972). The 1972 Democratic National
Convention acted upon the recommendation of the McGovern Commission and abolished the
winner-take-all primary for the 1976 convention. 1972 RULES COmMnITrEE REPORT, supra note 11.
The rarity of the winner-take-all device in the nomination process should be contrasted with
its universality in the general presidential election. Every state uses a "general ticket" to elect
electors. A candidate winning a plurality of such a state's popular vote consequently wins its entire
electoral vote. Despite the movement away from winner-take-all devices in the nomination process,
no comparable movement in the manner of choosing electors has developed. The state's different
interests in the nomination and election stages have caused the movement in the one area and not
in the other.
155. See notes 19-35 supra and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
157. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
158. Id. at 233-34.
159. "The Court misstates the question we must decide. ...
It is said that the general election is over and that a new, and different alternative procedure
is now about to be used. But that is belied by the realities. . . . The election, commencing with
the primary, will indeed not be finally completed until the winner has taken the oath of office."
385 U.S. at 238 (Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, JJ., & Warren, C.J., dissenting).
160. "A legislator when voting for governor has only a single vote. Even if he followed the
majority vote of his constituency, he would necessarily disregard the votes of those who voted for
the other candidate, whether their votes almost carried the day or were way in the minority." Id.
at 240.
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Gray on the ground that the legislature was in effect a convention 6, and
thus could have held that the rationale used to invalidate the county unit
system in Gray was inapplicable to a mixed voting and convention
system, 162 the Court instead chose to hold only that the principles of
Gray did not apply because there had been no commitment to a popular
election in the alternative procedure used for the selection of a governor.
While the Supreme Court's opinion in Fortson v. Morris distin-
guished Gray only on the ground that the alternative procedure for
selecting a governor was not intended to be an elective process, its rather
strained interpretation of the facts must be evidence of its unarticulated
concern with the broader implications of the Gray doctrine. If the Court
mechanically had relied on Gray to control the Fortson selection proce-
dure as the district court did, 63 Gray's constitutional doctrine subse-
quently might have been extended far beyond the nomination context.
Unleashed without modification into the context of a general election,
Gray could be very stiff medicine'64 because there are some situations
when the state's interest in stable and effective government may out-
weigh the individual's interest in full representation of his views. Two
such situations are the election of electors to the Electoral College and
the election of state legislators. This occurs only because the interest of
the state in stable and effective government is stronger and because the
individual's interest in full and effective representation is more com-
pletely protected in such situations than in an intermediate stage of the
presidential nominating process.'65
(a) The Electoral College.-Although the state interest in stable
and efficient government is not served by discarding votes at an interme-
161. One interpretation of Fortson notes that it sanctions a "representative process in the
performance of a nonlegislative task, after the voters have exercised untrammeled their right to
choose first-tier spokesmen." Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 27, at 202. Chambers and Rotunda
conclude that "Fortson and Gray together thus permit selection of an officer through indirect
election by a representative body, but not by a mechanical unit system," and indicate that a
multistage selection of delegates to the national convention is permissible. Id. The Chambers and
Rotunda explanation apparently has its roots in the Harvard Law Review's survey of Supreme
Court decisions for the October 1966 Term, which, however, acknowledged that its proffered
rationale was "left unmentioned even by the majority." See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81
HARV. L. REv. 69, 149-50 (1967).
162. See 372 U.S. at 378 n.10.
163. In a short per curiam opinion, the district court mechanically had applied the Gray
rationale without considering any of the possible complications that could arise by applying the
rationale, without modification, to a general election. See 262 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
164. See generally Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), in which the Supreme Court
expressed its unwillingness to establish a right of minority representation in a state legislature. See
also Barton, supra note 63, at 165-72.
165. See Note, supra note 16, at 1239-40 n.45.
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diate stage of the presidential nominating procedure, the interest in
governmental stability at the presidential election stage is more appar-
ent, and all states employ the "general ticket" method of selecting
electors to promote that interest. Challenges to this method of selecting
electors have not met with success.
166
If the general ticket method were discarded, splinter groups in each
state would be able to secure part of its electoral votes. Without any
incentive to resolve conflicts prior to the election, dissident groups
would tend to forego compromise and instead would take their case
directly to the electorate hoping for at least a portion of the electoral
vote. The consequence would be reduced stability, and the President
could no longer claim that he represented a national consensus. More-
over, such a system would increase the likelihood that no majority
would evolve in the Electoral College, therefore increasing the possi-
bility that the House of Representatives would select the President, in
which case each state, regardless of size, would be entitled to a single
vote."6 7 Any system leading to the use of this antiquated device must
be viewed with skepticism.6 8
The Constituion also establishes each state as the formal unit for
elector selection and specifically empowers the states to appoint the
electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."' 69 The
inclusion of the Electoral College principle within the Constitution was
"the result of specific historical concerns,"1 70 and this textual commit-
ment of elector selection to the state legislature places its choice of
method beyond strict judicial scrutiny. No similar command exists for
the selection of delegates in the nominating process.
The difference in function between the Electoral College and a
nominating convention also is significant. The Electoral College is not
a deliberative, representative body; rather, it is an assembly created to
register one prior decision of a majority of its constituency. An individ-
ual's right to have his minority position represented and the general
democratic-societal need to have full articulation of political minority
views consequently are disruptive to the function of the Electoral Col-
lege. The nominating conventions, however, are deliberative bodies
meant to form the broadest possible coalition of viewpoints and select
166. See, e.g., Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966); Williams v. Board of Elections,
288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 320 (1969).
167. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
168. See Note, supra note 68, at 1467-68 n.37.
169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I.
170. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963).
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a nominee for the presidency acceptable to that coalition."' In a nomi-
nating convention, individual interest and societal need are stronger and
harmonize with the convention's basic function. Indeed, unless minority
positions are represented at the convention, the coalition process might
not occur.17  A state may, therefore, be able to carry its burden of
justification and limit the interest of individuals in fair and effective
representation in the context of a general ticket to select electors, but
fail to carry its burden of justification regarding the winner-take-all
primary method of selecting delegates to the national nominating con-
vention.
(b) The State Legislatures.-Although the states have no overrid-
ing interest in maintaining a winner-take-all primary, their interest in
stable and effective government may be sufficient to justify limiting
political minority representation in their legislatures.173 One important
justification lies in the differences between the nomination stage and the
election itself. In a two-party system, political coalitions normally are
formed prior to the election "under the pressure of the need to obtain a
victorious candidate."''7  Forming political coalitions before the election
171. Professor Bickel describes these 2 types of institutions as follows: "There are by and
large . . two sorts of multi-member democratic institutions: the representative deliberative as-
sembly, and the body meant to register a single prior decision of its constituency. Congress is the
typical institution of the former sort, the electoral college of the latter. . . .Institutions meant to
act by;registering the decision of a majority of their constituency should consist of members
responsive to that majority, and of no one else. Deliberative institutions, charged also to think,
should reflect as many significant factions in the total constituency as possible. That is why all
American legislatures are districted. None is elected at large, to be a creature wholly of the
majority, nor does any state send to Congress an entire delegation elected on a statewide basis."
A. BICKEL, supra note 148, at 26.
172. See id. at 26-27.
173. "[W]hile the interest in full and effective participation by political minorities must be
deemed fundamental, a state may, for compelling and constitutionally permissible reasons, give
less than full protection to this interest. In the case of state legislatures, there are strong interests
in favor of single-member districts which counterbalance the interests of political minorities in
substantially proportional representation. First, the function of a legislature is to govern, not to
make only a single decision. The makeup of majorities within each district may shift on every issue
before the legislature, and no system of selecting a legislator can assure that he will carry out the
wishes only of those who voted for him. In addition, a legislator serves his constituents in ways
other than voting, and it is not accurate to say that the voters for the losing candidate are effectively
unrepresented.
"The second strong state interest in single-member constituencies is the promotion of the two-
party system. While Williams v. Rhodes [citation omitted] limits the extent to which a state may
justify its statutory voting regulations by referring to the interest in two-party government, it seems
to indicate that there is such a constitutionally recognizable interest. Cf Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S.
241 (1952). Single-member legislative districts, themselves an attempt to assure a degree of minor-
ity representation, would therefore seem to be a justifiable deviation from a standard of strict
proportional representation." Note, supra note 16, at 1239-40 n.45.
174. Barton. supra note 63, at 168.
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leaves a majority party in control of the legislatures with sufficient
popular support to govern effectively immediately after the election.'
In the context of the election itself, however, proportional representa-
tion attempts to "create a legislature that corresponds exactly to the
spectrum of political views of the electorate."' 76 Unlike the nominating
conventions, which basically make a single choice and a single compro-
mise, a legislature is an ongoing political body charged with making an
entire range of political decisions through compromise and bargaining.
Full enforcement of the right to political minority representation
through proportional representation would minimize the incentives for
compromise prior to the election and place splinter parties in pivotal
positions by giving them enough votes to frustrate essential legislation.
Effective legislation therefore would require compromise within the leg-
islative chamber, but since the range of issues is broad, coalitions would
vary according to the specific issues involved. Building effective and
stable majorities would be a most tenuous business. Obduracy by any
faction could result in legislative inaction and ineffectiveness-in short,
stalemate.' In the context of a nominating convention, however, the
risk of inaction is slim; the pressures of time and political expediency
175. Barton points out that the 2-party system is more accountable to voters because, when
they cast their ballots, they have a better idea of the structure and the goals of the coalition
hammered out before election day. Id. at 169.
176. Id. at 168.
177. A representative from a single-member constituency feels an especial obligation to his
own constituents, not only in terms of voting representation, but also as an advocate for the many
interests of his constituents. He is directly and visibly accountable to his constituents, and in order
to assure some probability of re-election, be must serve his entire constituency. In contrast, under
proportional representation, a legislator would not represent any identificable individual or district.
The state therefore clearly has a strong interest in maintaining the feature of the 2-party system
that makes legislators accountable to their constituents, although that may require some sacrifice
of the interest in maximum political spectrum representation at the locus of effective decision-
making. On the other hand, Professor Bickel has noted that the use of legislative districts is itself
a means of promoting diversity of political viewpoints within a deliberative body. A. BICKEL, supra
note 148, at 26. Districting represents a compromise between the goals of proportional representa-
tion and political stability. No state chooses its legislators on a statewide, winner-take-all slate
basis, and Congress has guaranteed that members of the House of Representatives will be chosen
from single-member districts in order to encourage broad representation of political groups. See
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157-59 nn.38-39 (1971). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
said that courts reapportioning legislatures should use single-member districts whenever feasible.
See Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
The same state interests in accountability and constituency representation do not exist in the
case of a nominating convention. Delegates are not re-elected on the basis of prior performance
and there is little need for geographical identification within the state. Instead, the need is for
adequate reflection at the national nominating conventions of the relative baseline strengths of the
competing candidates. As a consequence, there is little need for each delegate solely to represent a
geographic constituency within his state.
THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL PRIMARY
cause the party factions to coalesce around a standard bearer. Conse-
quently, the states may be able to justify limiting political minority
representation within their legislatures in order to protect their interest
in stable and effective government, but cannot use the same justifica-
tions to limit minority representation in a political nominating conven-
tion.
B. Political Spectrum Issues in General Elections
Although its interest in stable and efficient government is cogniza-
bly stronger during a final election than during the nomination process,
a state clearly does not have unlimited power to diminish the individ-
ual's interest in full and effective representation at the ultimate decision-
making forum. 78 Although the doctrine of Gray v. Sanders may not be
entirely applicable to state legislatures or other ultimate decision-
making forums, courts have listened sympathetically to political spec-
trum issues in a number of contexts.' For example, when blacks have
raised the argument that switching from a single-member district to an
at-large system of representation has diluted their voting strength, the
courts have been responsive.8 0 Regardless of racial motivation, how-
ever, a system of representation that operates to dilute or cancel out the
voting strength of a political minority, or one that is biased in favor of
particular political interests violates the equal protection clause;18' equal
protection sometimes requires a measure of political spectrum represen-
tation even at the general election stage.1
2
The legislative multimember district cases, however, pose a signifi-
cant problem that arguably would prevent application of the Gray prin-
ciple to a nominating convention. Despite its declaration that any ap-
portionment scheme that "designedly or otherwise . . . would operate
to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
178. Although the power of a state to select electors to the Electoral College has special
constitutional recognition, that power is probably not beyond judicial scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. For example, California likely could not constitutionally allocate 50% of its
Electoral College electors to an election by the residents of San Francisco and allocate the remain-
ing 50% to an at large election by the state's other residents.
179. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Allen v. Board of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
180. See Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901
(M.D. Ala. 1966), modified, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967), cited approvingly in Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
181. See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1971); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397
U.S. 50, 57-58 (1970).
182. Of course, the winner-take-all primary, which rewards the plurality winner and ignores
all others, has a structural bias that cannot withstand strict constitutional scrutiny.
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elements of the voting population" would violate equal protection,, 3
the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate a multimember districting
plan. '4 In such cases, the Court has refused to establish a per se rule
that multimember districts violate equal protection; instead, it has re-
quired a case-by-case showing of vote dilution.8 5 For example, in
Whitcomb v. Chavis,'s' a recent challenge to a multimember legislative
district, the Court acknowledged that a system structured so as to dilute
or cancel out the voting strength of a political minority would violate
equal protection,8 7 but found that the plaintiffs had not carried their
burden of proof and shown that their political strength actually had been
canceled out or diluted.' The Court rejected the district court's finding
of dilution and noted that whenever a candidate in the general election
loses, one can argue that his supporters were without a legislative voice
of their own:
[P]laintiffs' position comes to this: that although they have equal opportunity to
participate in and influence the selection of candidates and legislators, and although
the ghetto votes predominantly Democratic and that party slates candidates satis-
factory to the ghetto, invidious discrimination nevertheless results when the ghetto,
along with all other Democrats, suffers the disaster of losing too many elections., "
Mr. Justice White, the author of the majority opinion in Chavis,
characterized the district court's finding as "expressive of the more
general proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be
represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at
least one seat and represents a majority living in an area sufficiently
compact to constitute a single-member district."'88 The Court under-
standably was concerned about such an approach for the same reasons
that it is reluctant to extend the doctrine of Gray v. Sanders-the princi-
ple is not easily contained. 9' Moreover, Justice White indicated that if
all interest groups are entitled to representation at the ultimate decision-
making forum-in this case, the legislative chamber-then the Court
would have to deal with similar claims from labor groups, the university
community, and religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable geo-
183. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
184. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142-43 (1971).
185. See id. at 142-44.
186. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
187. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
188. 403 U.S. at 149-55.
189. Id. at 153. The Court also noted that plaintiffs argument applied to single-member
districts as well as multimember districts-especially "safe" single-member districts. Id.
190. Id. at 156.
191. Id. at 156-57.
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graphic areas.9 2 Chavis, however, did not indicate that courts should not
listen sympathetically to political spectrum issues when they are raised
in an intraparty context; rather, Justice White's opinion explicitly ac-
knowledges that the issues involved in a general election are significantly
different from those arising in an intraparty case. For example, Justice
White noted that plaintiffs had directed their challenge to the "legisla-
tive forum where public policy is finally fashioned,"' 9 3 apparently be-
cause they believed that the "chance of winning or significantly influenc-
ing intraparty fights" was "inadequate protection to minorities, politi-
cal, racial, or economic .. .. *"1" Since, as this Article has argued
above, 95 the considerations that caution against extension of the doc-
trine of Gray v. Sanders to general elections do not have the same force
in an intraparty context, Justice White's refusal to apply the Gray
principle in Chavis should be explained on that basis. Indeed, requiring
the political parties to safeguard the interest of voters in fair and effec-
tive representation in the intraparty context seemingly would be a logi-
cal outgrowth of Chavis' intimation that the "chance of winning or
significantly influencing intraparty fights" should minimize the import-
ance of establishing a constitutional right of political spectrum represen-
tation in "the legislative forum where public policy is finally fash-
ioned."'
The winner-take-all primary and a multimember district differ in
three other fundamental respects. First, a delegate to a presidential
nominating convention does not respond to the same pressures as a state
legislator. Consequently, application of the Gray principle to a multi-
member district may be unwise. For example, a state legislator is re-
quired to make a large range of political choices as well as serve his
constituency in numerous nonvoting functions;'97 moreover, he repre-
192. Id.
193. Id. at 159.
194. Id.
195. See notes 107-23 supra and accompanying text.
196. Some political scientists advocate party competition as a means of exercising influence
within political parties. See Note, supra note 27, at 556-58. The theory seemingly is related to the
economic model in which consumer sovereignty hinges upon the ability of the consumer to switch
brands or substitute similar products. In the 2-party system, however, it is not clear that a similar
mechanism functions adequately. Consumer sovereignty requires innumerable alternatives that
simply do not exist in a 2-party system. Although the need to attract independent voters may effect
marginal shifts in policy orientation, party competition alone likely will be insufficient to provide
the stimulus necessary for political spectrum representation. See generally W. BURNHAM, supra
note 150, at 118-34. For an interesting theoretical discussion by an economist of the relative merits
of party competition ("exit") and intraparty democracy ("voice") in influencing organization
behavior see A. HIRSCIIMAN, EXIT, VoIcE AND LOYALTY (1970).
197. For example, constituents often ask their representative for assistance in dealing with
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sents, by definition, all members of his constituency. The multimember
legislative district therefore does not automatically eliminate the non-
plurality voter from fair and effective representation. Unless the situa-
tion is one-sided, a shift in political alignments could result in a legisla-
tor's ouster from office at the next election. Secondly, any winner-take-
all element in a multimember district is a coincidental outgrowth of the
district's own voting patterns. Split tickets can win elections in multi-
member districts. Unlike Whitcomb v. Chavis, in which "the failure of
the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population
emerge[d] more as a function of losing elections than of built-in bias,"', 8
the failure of nonplurality political factions to have representation on a
winner-take-all delegate slate is mandated by the built-in bias of the
primary itself.'99 Thirdly, the Supreme Court has noted that the oppor-
tunity for abuse in multimember districts is greater, and proving built-
in bias against a political minority is easier, if "districts are large in
relation to the total number of legislators." ' Viewed against this guide-
line, California's winner-take-all primary poses a very high possibility
for abuse.
V. BROWN V. O'BRIEN: THE CREDENTIALS CHALLENGE AND ITS
AFTERMATH
In April 1972, supporters of each of the Democratic and Republi-
can candidates in the California primary filed suit in the Supreme Court
of California seeking to have the Winner-take-all feature of the state's
primary declared invalid. In an exercise of discretion, the court declined
to take original jurisdiction or rule on the merits of the action. The
imminence of the primary election prevented any further action prior
to the election date.2"' Senator Humphrey subsequently lost the primary
election to Senator McGovern by some five percentage points.2 2 Hum-
phrey's supporters unsuccessfully turned to the courts in another at-
tempt to have the election's winner-take-all feature invalidated. They
the governmental bureaucracy or for information not easily available to an ordinary citizen.
Constituents therefore view their legislator as an advocate for their parochial interests in the
government.
198. 403 U.S. at 153.
199. See also Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
200. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
201. See Barron v. Brown, Civil No. S.A.C. 7939 (Cal. Sup. Ct., May 3, 1972). The author
of this article was chief counsel for petitioners in the case and wishes to acknowledge the editorial
assistance of Vincent Chieffo and Charles Rosenberg, of the California bar, and the research
assistance of David Fishback, Frank Martin, and Paul Weirbos in preparation of the brief in that
case.
202. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
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sought a share of California's delegates based on their voting strength
in the primary. 203 Denied relief, they took their grievance to the Creden-
tials Committee of the 1972 Democratic National Convention and suc-
ceeded in ousting part of McGovern's California slate.204 The ousted
McGovern delegates then took their turn in court, and Judge Hart of
the District of Columbia District Court initially denied relief.2 5 The
Court of Appeals reversed his decision, holding that the action of the
Credentials Committee violated due process of law.20 6 Sitting in special
session, the Supreme Court stayed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
without acting on the accompanying petition for a writ of certiorari. The
Court's action left the outcome of the controversy squarely to the Dem-
ocratic National Convention. The Convention reversed the decision of
its Credentials Committee and voted to seat all the pro-McGovern Cali-
fornia delegates. This section will argue that the action of the Creden-
tials Committee was improper, and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is supportable, in view of the limited alternatives available to
the court.
A. The Issues Before the Credentials Committee
The Humphrey supporters evidently adopted two lines of attack
before the Credentials Committee.2 07 First, they argued that the McGov-
ern Commission guidelines barred use of the winner-take-all primary.
The hearing examiner appointed by the Credentials Committee, noting
that the guidelines were phrased in the "urge" language rather than the
"require" language, unequivocally rejected that position.0 8 After the
hearing examiner filed his report, the Humphrey supporters dropped
their first ground of attack.0 9 Renewing their challenge before the Cre-
dentials Committee itself, the Humphrey forces relied solely upon a
second mode of attack. They maintained that the winner-take-all pri-
mary violated the mandate of the 1968 Democratic National Conven-
tion to the McGovern Commission, which required that "[t]he unit rule
203. See TIME, July 3, 1972, at 11.
204. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1972, § N, at 40, col. 3; TIME, July 10, 1972, at 15.
205. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1972, at 4, col. 7.
206. Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628 (D.C. Cir.), judgment stayed, 92 S. Ct. 2718
(1972).
207. For a discussion of the role of the Credentials Committee in constitutional adjudication
see Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the 1968-and 1972-Democratic National
Conventions, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1438 (1969), who state: "It does not seem reasonable to expect
the Credentials Committee of the National Convention to decide hard issues of constitutional
interpretation about which courts are in doubt." Id. at 1449-50.
208. Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628, at 6-8 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
209. Id. at 4.
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not be used in any stage of the delegate selection process ... ."10 On
that basis, the Credentials Committee voted to exclude 151 pro-
McGovern California delegates.2 '
Writing in 1969 about the mandate of the 1968 Democratic Na-
tional Convention that abolished the unit rule, two commentators noted
that majority rule mechanisms at preliminary stages in the delegate
selection process might have the same disfranchising result as the unit
rule.2 2 The McGovern Commission also recognized the problem and
urged the states to provide for minority representation in 1972;1 both
the Commission 214 and the commentators21 5 acknowledged, however,
that the abolition of the unit rule by the 1968 Convention did not require
elimination of the winner-take-all primary.
The pro-McGovern California delegates adopted the same ap-
proach and argued that the 1968 mandate did not compel the abolition
of winner-take-all primaries; that the candidates and party officials had
never interpreted the 1968 resolution to require the elimination of
winner-take-all primaries; and that the "legislative history" of the 1968
mandate gave no support to the position that the reformers had contem-
plated the abolition of winner-take-all primaries .2 1  The Credentials
Committee perfunctorily rejected these arguments.
2 17
B. The Issues In the Court of Appeals
The court of appeals accepted each of the McGovern delegates'
arguments. It determined that the 1968 mandate was vague and indeter-
minate,218 and that the legislative history provided no support for the
proposition that the reformers had contemplated the abolition of
winner-take-all primaries. 219 Furthermore, the court noted that all par-
ties had justifiably relied on the repeated assertions of party officials
210. Id. at 4, 8. See also text accompanying notes 3-15 supra.
211. Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628, at 4-5 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
212. See Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 207, at 1458-59.
213. See McGOVERN COMIISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 44-45.
214. Id. at 35-36.
215. See Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 207, at 1459.
216. See Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628, at 6-9 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972). The Hughes
Commission refused to "flatly condemn the winner-take-all principle in state primaries, since
such primaries offer a useful device for engaging popular interest and involvement in the process
of selecting a President." Id. at 9 (citing HUGHES COIMMNSSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 19). The
position is similar to that taken by Professor Bickel, a member of the Hughes Commission. See
A. BICKEL, supra note 119, at 57-58; supra note 148, at 25-26.
217. See Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628, at 9 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
218. Id. at 9-10.
219. Id. at 10.
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that the mandate had not proscribed winner-take-all primaries.2 ' As a
result of these findings, the court made its determinative evaluation of
the case: "[T]he Democratic Party did not merely interpret one of its
rules-in essence, it acted in defiance of its own rules as interpreted in
the Call for the 1972 Convention by establishing retroactively an en-
tirely new and unannounced standard of conduct." '221 Such conduct,
concluded the court, violated due process of law. 222 The significance of
the decision lies not only in its ultimate holding, but also in the court's
treatment of the state action and ripeness issues.
1. State Action.-The court of appeals, citing Terry v. Adams
223
and Georgia v. National Democratic Party,24 experienced no difficulty
surmounting the threshold barrier of state action. The Supreme Court,
on the other hand, expressed "grave doubts" about the action of the
court of appeals on this basis and noted that credentials challenges
normally concern intraparty disputes, which are determined by the con-
vention itself.25 Lynch v. Torquato,226 Maxey v. Washington State Dem-
ocratic Committee,227 and Seergy v. Kings County Republican County
Committee,28 however, all indicate that political parties must adhere to
constitutional standards in their governmental activities, which include
the nominating function.
Nevertheless, the court's intervention does pose the question of the
propriety of judicial application of constitutional restrictions to a pri-
vate association.229 In Georgia v. National Democratic Party, however,
the court of appeals squarely held that the allocation of delegates to the
states for representation at the Democratic National Convention consti-
tuted state action. In essence, Georgia applied the rationale of Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 12.
223. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
224. 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
225. O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (1972).
226. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
227. 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
228. 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972).
229. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 142, which states: "The internal
processes by which these political determinations [that is, internal compromise] are made are ill-
understood, and perhaps better left unexplored. To find that these processes are by the Constitution
subject to judicial scrutiny would seriously hamper their operation and burden the courts, and it
seems impossible to create procedural devices which would protect against abuse and yet permit
the requisite degree of autonomy." Id. at 1061. The Supreme Court also hesitated to decide
O'Brien v. Brown for similar reasons. See 92 S. Ct. at 2720. See also note 142 supra.
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and Secondary Schools, Inc.23 to the delegate allocation situation. 21
In Marjorie Webster, the court of appeals had assumed but did not hold
that an accrediting agency, which also was a private association, was
subject to the restrictions of due process.112 In its opinion in Marjorie
Webster, the court noted that the nature of the agency's activity233 and
the recognition accorded to accreditation by federal educational grant
programs could render the action of the association state action for the
purpose of applying the due process clause.234 Indeed, in Rice v.
Elmore, 2 3 a case tacitly approved by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Adams,236 the Fourth Circuit stated the modern view of the relationship
between party and state:
The party may, indeed, have been a mere private aggregation of individuals in the
early days of the Republic, but with the passage of the years, political parties have
become in effect state institutions, governmental agencies through which sovereign
power is exercised by the people. m
According to Terry v. Adams, the nomination process is an integral part
of the election machinery subject to constitutional scrutiny.231 Moreo-
ver, the recognition granted to successful nominees by the various states
in their ballots makes the~action of the parties in the nomination process
the action of the states.
239
2. Ripeness.-In an earlier challenge involving the Illinois delega-
tion to the 1972 Democratic National Convention, District Judge Hart
had invalidated certain McGovern Commission guidelines that he inter-
230. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
231. Several law review articles also are persuasive in making a case for state action. See,
e.g., Bellamy, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Allocation of Delegates to the
Democratic National Convention, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 892, 895-97 (1970); Note, supra note
9, at 476-77. But see Note, supra note 27, at 538-45.
232. 432 F.2d at 653.
233. Among other cases, the court cited Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), for the
proposition that state action depends upon the function at issue. The Supreme Court recently used
the functional approach in a different context in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (operation
of a park is a state function and therefore may not be operated on a segregated basis).
234. 432 F.2d at 658. Judges Bazelon and MacKinnon were on the panel that decided
Marjorie Webster and also constituted the majority of the panel deciding Brown v. O'Brien.
235. 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
236. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
237. 165 F.2d at 389. See also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286 (1921) (Pitney,
J., concurring): "[T]he likelihood of a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomina-
tion is practically negligible. . . . As a practical matter, the ultimate choice of the mass of voters
is predetermined when the nominations have been made."
238. See text accompanying notes 20-24 and 82-85 supra.
239. See O'Brien v. Brown, 92 S. Ct. 2718, 2720 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ripon Soc'y v.
National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1972).
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preted to impose quotas based on race, sex and age. Since the suit had
been filed before the Credentials Committee had taken any action on
the challenge, the court of appeals vacated this decision on the ground
of prematurity.24 Deciding that the action of the Credentials Committee
raised a justiciable controversy in the California delegate contest, the
court of appeals intervened in the controversy at an intermediate stage
before the national convention had taken any final action.
When courts should involve themselves in the activities of political
parties is a question that cannot be answered easily.241 In granting the
stay of the court of appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court said that the
"[a]vailability of the convention as a forum to review the recommenda-
tions of the Credentials Committee" called for judicial restraint.
2 12
Sound policy reasons often justify delaying judicial intervention into the
affairs of a private association. If the courts avoid the conflict entirely,
informal negotiation and compromise may provide an effective long-run
solution to the controversy. Moreover, direct negotiation and compro-
mise likely would increase the internal responsibility of the party organi-
zation and provide a better basis on which to promote party unity in
the post-convention period. On the other hand, litigation tends to pro-
duce a "victory" for one side that hardens positions and makes compro-
mise difficult. The national nominating convention exists in order to
reach an accommodation on a party nominee and unify the party for
the general election. Intraparty litigation, which may short-circuit nego-
tiation, can thus frustrate the convention's very purpose.
Judicial restraint, however, perhaps was not the preferable answer
to the specific problem faced by the court of appeals. Justice Marshall
observed that the court of appeals had three available alternatives re-
garding intervention: intervention before the convention; intervention
after the convention had acted upon the report of its Credentials Com-
mittee; or intervention after the convention itself. 43 Justice Marshall
reasoned that delaying intervention until the middle of or after the
convention would represent a greater intrusion into the political process
of the party than intervention at the preconvention stage.244 He noted
that a court can fashion relief to minimize undesirable intrusion upon
the independence of political parties.2 14 He suggested that declaratory
240. See Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628, at 13 n.5, 15, 16 n.6, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. July
5, 1972).
241. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 142, at 1070-71.
242. 92 S. Ct. at 2720.
243. Id. at 2722.
244. Id. at 2722-23.




relief prior to the convention would put the party on notice of the
constitutional issues involved but, unlike injunctive relief, would not
interfere directly with the party's internal processes unless that interfer-
ence should become absolutely necessary.246 This seems like a sensible
approach which the court of appeals might have been well advised to
follow.
In a sense, the Supreme Court's majority gambled that the Demo-
cratic National Convention would reverse its Credentials Committee
and therefore avoid a major intrusion by the courts into the nomination
process. In this instance, the Court's gamble proved correct; however,
the stakes were high, and a miscalculation would have evoked subse-
quent intervention at an extraordinary cost. 47
3. The Constitutional Issues.-The court of appeals' finding that
the Credentials Committee changed the party rules after the primary led
to its decision that the McGovern delegates had been denied due process
of law. Eli Segal, general counsel for the McGovern Commission, has
argued that the McGovern Commission was a creature of the 1968
Democratic National Convention, and "[i]n the area of delegate selec-
tion, the Commission speaks for its creator, the 1968 Convention, in
much the same way that an administrative agency speaks for its creator,
the legislature. ' 248 In Segal's opinion the convention plays a dual
role-it is both a legislative and a judicial body.2 9 Segal argues that the
1968 Convention, in its legislative capacity, created the Commission
with a broad mandate.250 In the exercise of its rule-making power, the
Commission established its guidelines as its interpretation of the man-
date. " ' Viewing the Democratic National Convention as a "self-
246. 92 S. Ct. at 2723; Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 343 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C.
1972).
247. Although the court of appeals had to decide Brown v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court's
entire role in the drama was discretionary. For a discussion of the mediating devices that federal
courts may use to avoid sensitive political or constitutional issues see Bickel, The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961). The Court's decision to
act on an application for a stay in July, although it would not be able to act on the accompanying
petition for certiorari until October, raises serious questions about the propriety of the Court's use
of the stay. Although the stay ostensibly had no precedental force, Justice Marshall noted that it
had the same effect on the parties as would a ruling on the merits. 92 S. Ct. at 2726. However,
the parties had no opportunity to present argument or brief the issues further. Seen in this light,
the procedure employed may have been an abuse of judicial power, especially in view of the Court's
apparent zest to enter the fray and issue a nondecision which amounted to a rebuke of the court
of appeals.
248. Segal, supra note 3, at 882.
249. See id. at 883 n.58.
250. Id. at 882-83.
251. Id. at 883.
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contained legal system" he would find that the 1972 Credentials Com-
mittee and Convention sat in review of the Commission's work to deter-
mine whether the Commission exceeded its delegation of authority.
25 2
In reviewing credentials contests, he maintains that the convention
and its Credentials Committee perform essentially adjudicatory func-
tions, 2 3 although political considerations clearly will color much of this
adjudication.24 To a certain extent, such flexibility is desirable because
it allows the compromise and accommodation that strict adherence to
an adjudicatory model otherwise might thwart.
Recognizing the political system's need for flexibility, the court of
appeals indicated that political parties must have wide latitude to inter-
pret their own regulations;25 but the court also implied that there are
limits to the leeway that can be permitted in the name of flexibility.
256
In the California challenge, the Credentials Committee abandoned the
adjudication/negotiation norm and invoked a legislative mode of action
that jeopardized "the legitimacy of the process of electing the Presi-
dent. ' '12 7 The lack of any substantial support for the Credentials Com-
mittee's position that the 1968 mandate required abolition of the
winner-take-all primary justified the court's conclusion that retroactive
rule-making was involved.28
A dissent to the court of appeals' opinion argued that the retroac-
tive effect of the Credentials Committee's action did not make it uncon-
stitutional and cited SEC v. Chenery Corp.259 for that proposition. In
Chenery, the SEC prohibited management from trading in company
stock during a corporate reorganization, although there was no specific
SEC rule barring that particular conduct. The Supreme Court earlier
had held that general equitable grounds did not permit a flat SEC
prohibition of this conduct. 211 On remand, the SEC had found that the
specific conduct involved violated the thrust of the securities act.
Chen'ery upheld the SEC's reasoning and suggested three reasons
252. Id. at 883 n.58.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 883 n.60; Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 207, at 1466-67.
255. Brown v. O'Brien, Civil No. 72-1628, at 9 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 1972).
256. Id. at 10-11.
257. Id. at II.
258. A criminal law doctrine lends weight to the court of appeals' analysis. In a series of
cases beginning with Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), the Supreme Court
has maintained that a conviction devoid of evidentiary support violates due process. By analogy,
the Credentials Committee rested its interpretation of the 1968 mandate on a ground so unreasona-
ble as to violate due process.
259. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
260. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
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why an administrative agency might prefer to proceed on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis, without resort to administrative rule-making. First,
the conduct proscribed might be unforeseeable and the problem una-
voidable. 6' Secondly, the agency may not have sufficient experience to
warrant drafting a rule with its possible rigidity.262 Thirdly, some kinds
of conduct may be so specialized that it would be impossible to describe
them in terms of a general rule. 62 The Chenery Court held that in order
to determine whether an agency has exceeded its power when proceeding
on an ad hoc basis, a reviewing court should look at two
things-whether the agency based its action on substantial evidence and
whether its ruling was consistent with the power granted by Congress.6 4
In contrast to the Supreme Court's assessment of the SEC action
in Chenery, the court of appeals in the California challenge found that
the McGovern Commission had based its action on substantial evidence
and acted within its authorized power, but that the Credentials Commit-
tee had acted arbitrarily. The Committee was not proceeding on a case-
by-case basis with a view toward developing a rule of conduct, and it
had not applied the same standard of conduct to other delegations
elected in winner-take-all primaries.265 Moreover, a rule sufficient to
govern the situation already existed.26' The unfairness of the Commit-
tee's- action did not merely concern the inevitable retroactivity that
accompanies, for example, a court decision on the constitutionality of
a law, but rather the explicit retroactivity of a new rule established to
govern conduct that already had taken place. The Chenery decision
allows administrative flexibility to deal with unforeseen situations for
which no pre-existing rule exists. Perhaps, as the dissenters in Chenery
argued, even that decision permits administrative lawlessness,2 but the
"lawlessness" permitted in Chenery had a very different character from
the retroactive legislation involved in the California delegate challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has sketched the background and discussed the
perspective of recent party reform litigation. It has argued that the
261. 332 U.S. at 202.
262. Id. at 202-03.
263. Id. at 203.
264. Id. at 207.
265. The court of appeals did not rule on the equal protection aspects of the case. See Civil
No. 72-1628, at 12 n.4.
266. The Rules Committee, the convention's legislative branch, took responsibility for rec-
ommending abolition of winner-take-all primaries in 1976. 1972 RULES COItrrEE REPORT § 4.
267. 322 U.S. at 212-13 (Frankfurter & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
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winner-take-all, statewide-slate primary, especially in large states like
California, violates equal protection. Finally, it has taken the positions
that the action of the Credentials Committee of the 1972 Democratic
National Convention in rejecting the 151 McGovern delegates elected
in California's primary was improper, and that intervention by the court
of appeals was warranted despite the unconstitutionality of the winner-
take-all primary.

